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ABSTRACT
This dissertation contains two chapters: one on CDS and the firm’s behaviour towards
risk assumption and the other one corporate liquidity management in emerging markets.
The abstracts for each chapter are as follows.
Chapter 1: Credit Default Swaps and Risk-Shifting: Good News for Constrained Firms
We hypothesize that CDS discriminate risk choices according to firm’s financial status, being
constrained firms more restrained than financially flexible ones. We take this prediction to
the data using actual CDS trades around the financial crisis of 2007-2008, and a counter-
factual CDS sample around the junk bond crisis of 1990. Taken together, estimates from
theses two exercises suggest that CDS makes constrained firms more cautious in their in-
vestment decisions when the economic environment is uncertain. Our result indicates that
CDS could prevent firms from entering distressed renegotiations, reduce the incidence of the
empty-creditor problem they give rise to and help stabilize the economy in downturns.
Chapter 2: Liquidity Management Instruments in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Brazil
We characterize the liquidity management of firms that operate in Brazil through the de-
scription of both cash policies and the use of credit lines. We document an increase in cash
ratios for firms of all sizes, which results in aggregate cash ratios doubling from 2002 to 2011.
We find evidence that this secular increase is associated with the precautionary motive for
holding cash and the low potential for credit lines to make up for cash. Domestic credit
lines show interesting features that could help explain the side role they play in the liquidity
management of Brazilian firms.
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Chapter 1
Credit Default Swaps and
Risk-Shifting: Good News for
Constrained Firms
1.1 Introduction
The market for credit default swaps (CDS) grew almost tenfold during the last decade.
It peaked in 2008, with 57 trillion dollars, and its exuberance coincides with the decline of
financial markets. CDS were actually regarded as one of the main factors driving the recent
economic crisis. Since then, concerns about its role in the economy and how we should
regulate the market for credit insurance have been raised.
The villain brought about by CDS is the empty-creditor problem. The hypothesis was
first advanced in Hu and Black (2008) and it claims that creditors holding both debt and
insurance against debt default (CDS), no longer have an interest in the continuation of the
firm–even when it is efficient to do so. Creditors may, for that reason, push firms into
bankruptcy inefficiently. The occurrence of over-insurance1 makes the problems created
1Over-insurance occurs when the amount of protection purchased (payoffs) surpasses the amount of debt
that can be recovered in default.
1
by empty creditors even worse. Therefore, understanding, reinforcing, or counteracting its
effects is the agenda of current theoretical and empirical research.
In this paper, we ask if it is possible that credit default swaps help alleviate the con-
sequences of the empty-creditor problem they give rise to. We hypothesize that CDS offer
incentives for distressed firms to assume less risks and prevent them from risk-shifting. In
other words, even though financially troubled firms are the ones thought to engage in riskier
activities during difficult times, CDS could limit their risk exposure. Limiting the risk ex-
posure of the distressed firms could lower the incidence of bankruptcy and attenuate the
empty-creditor problem.
There are two effects that CDS may have on firm manager’s decisions that help build
the argument. On one hand, CDS boosts firm’s debt capacity. This benefit of accessing
external funds in better terms comes from the tougher hand in renegotiations CDS grant
to insured creditors, and the consequent reduction in the odds of strategic defaults (Bolton
and Oehmke, 2010; Campello and Matta, 2013). In particular, firms that are on the brink
of taking on riskier, negative-NPV projects, due to debt overhang, for instance (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976), may benefit more when creditors purchase insurance. Therefore, their in-
centives towards risk-shifting might be weakened by the increased debt capacity. On top of
the increase in debt capacity, CDS can incentivize managers in financially healthy (or flexible)
firms to engage in risk-shifting. These firms, and only them, would have the ability to tap
on riskier projects in their portfolios to avoid the outcomes associated with over-insurance
(Campello and Matta, 2012). Accordingly, unlike the financially flexible firms, distressed
firms cannot take on riskier projects in response to the amount of insurance purchased by
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creditors. Therefore firms in the entire spectrum of financial health gain by having a CDS-
induced improvement in credit terms. However, the advances should not be the same for
all firms, and this should be reflected in different risk appetites depending on their financial
status. As a result, distressed firms with CDS against their debt would behave differently
from distressed firms without CDS w.r.t. risk exposure.
Hence, we want to test whether firms financial status interact with managers’ incentives
to change their risk appetite because of CDS. More specifically, we evaluate whether changes
in financial status affect investment and for different levels of expected uncertainty, in the
presence of CDS–adapting Eisdorfer (2008). In this case, not only financially flexible firms
serve as a benchmark against which we gauge the effect of CDS, but also it helps make
a stronger case for the CDS effect on risk choice–otherwise there would be no distinction
on the behavior of distressed and healthy firms. We expect that in samples of CDS firms
the sensitivity of investment to financial status to be more pronounced where the expected
volatility is higher, for risk-shifting incentives are stronger. Moreover, distressed firms should
reduce investments more than financially flexible firms in line with increased debt capacity.
Moreover, since we are interested in the outcomes of distressed firms with CDSvis-a-
vis distressed, non-CDS firms, we use a counterfactual sample to gauge the effect over the
(CDS-like) non-CDS firms. Unlike the other papers in the literature that compare (or match)
outcomes using actual samples of CDS and non-CDS firms, our strategy helps mitigate the
effects of firms characteristics, observed or unobserved, that make them more likely to be in
one group or the other. We make a relevant contribution on this front addressing this lack of
randomness, by inferring a CDS sample at a time when CDS were not even traded. With this
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procedure we make more appropriate comparisons between actual (CDS firms) and counter-
factual (non-CDS firms) samples and push in the direction of freeing the estimates of bias.
One difficulty, however, is that risk exposure, portfolio choices, and financial status may
be all decisions made simultaneously by the firm; the conventional proxies for financial
health used in the literature may result in biased estimates in this setting. We circumvent
that problem by employing rather exogenous sources of variation in financial health. For
the actual-CDS sample, following Almeida et al. (2011), we stratify firms by the percentage
of debt due immediately after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Those with larger propor-
tion of long-term debt maturing are thought of as distressed while financially flexible firms
do not have to bother with payments due in the short-term. For the counterfactual-CDS
sample, we build on Lemmon and Roberts (2010) and contrast below-investment-grade and
unrated firms around the junk bond crisis of 1990. In this setting, below-investment-grade
firms play distressed, since they face a cutback in the supply of capital. Although relying
in different groups of firms and metrics, the variables deliver exogenous variation in firms’
financial status and allow us to gauge their impact on risk appetite.
Both setups, around sudden, unexpected shocks to firms financial status, lead naturally
to the use of Diff-in-Diff estimators. Despite the small number of firms in the samples, taken
together, the results for actual and counterfactual CDS samples suggest that CDS discrimi-
nate risk exposure behavior between constrained and more financially flexible firms. While in
the actual CDS sample, distressed firms reduce investment more prominently when economic
prospects are uncertain, in the counterfactual exercise there is no distinction between firms
according to their financial status; The hypothesis we convey is not rejected in the data.
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Our paper joins the literature that highlights the pluses of CDS. Besides addressing a
methodological limitation that permeates empirical evaluation of CDS effects on firms’ de-
cisions, it sheds light on another potential benefit of CDS. Although the empty-creditor
problem pushes firms into bankruptcy more often, our results point to CDS keeping dis-
tressed firms from entering states where credit events occur, triggers CDS payments and firms
are inefficiently liquidated. This effect could help mitigate the unwanted consequence of the
empty-creditor problem inherent to CDS and have a stabilizing effect in economic downturns.
In the following sections, we first describe the empirical attempts to gauge effects of the
emergence of the CDS market, the empty creditor problem among them, and develop our
working hypothesis, . In section 3, we detail our empirical research design. Section 4 discuss
data and results. In the last section, we conclude.
1.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Most attempts to address, both theoretically and empirically, how CDS affect the relation
between creditors and debtors are related to the empty-creditor problem. The hypothesis
was first advanced in Hu and Black (2008) and it claims that creditors holding both debt and
insurance against debt default (CDS), no longer have an interest in the continuation of the
firm–even when it is efficient to do so. Creditors may, therefore, push firms into bankruptcy
inefficiently.
Bolton and Oehmke (2011) adds to this ex-post inefficiency of CDS, their ex-ante benefits.
They model CDS as a commitment device that alters the behavior of debtors by empower-
ing creditors in ex-post renegotiations. Hence, firms with limited ability to commit to repay
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their debt may benefit from the presence of CDS. One such benefit would be an increase
in ex-ante debt capacity, as creditors extract more in renegotiations and see a reduction in
the firm’s incentives to strategically default. So, balancing ex-ante and ex-post effects is
necessary to judge whether CDS contribute to the economy.
Campello and Matta (2013) further pushes the argument toward beneficial effects of
CDS by linking the demand for credit insurance to the state of the economy. In their model,
over-insurance is associated with higher likelihood that projects succeed and alleviate the
empty-creditor problem. In times when economic prospects are good, higher demand for
CDS ease constraints and increase the amount of credit available in the economy. In busts,
however, creditors demand less insurance and do not exacerbate the empty-creditor problem
when it would most hardly hit the economy down.
Accordingly, empirical studies on the subject tackle the existence of such beneficial or
harmful effects of CDS. Bedendo et al. (2009) looks more closely at the empty-creditor prob-
lem implications by studying how economic fundamentals affect restructuring outcomes: any
difference in restructuring outcomes between reference and non-reference entities2 indicates
that something else might be pushing firms into bankruptcy, including empty creditors. The
results suggest that the availability of credit insurance via CDS does not affect the debt
restructuring process–distressed exchanges vs. Chapter 11 filings.
Also assessing the negative effect of CDS, Subrahmanyam et al. (2011) suggests that there
exists a relation between the initiation of CDS trading against a firm’s debt and an increase
2From Investopedia: “The reference entity bears the credit risk of the contract, and can be a corporation,
government or other legal entity that issues debt of any kind. If a credit event such as a default occurs and
the reference entity is unable to satisfy the conditions of the bond, the buyer of the credit default swaps
receives payment from the seller.”
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in its bankruptcy likelihood (and rating downgrade). Although the tests basically evaluate
credit ratings differences and bankruptcy probabilities before and after the introduction of
CDS, the paper, interestingly, speculates about the channel through which credit deteri-
oration occurs. Using CDS contracts details featured in their proprietary database, they
are able to elect the increased investor’s bargaining power in renegotiations–instead of the
investor’s lack of monitoring–as the main force through which the empty-creditor operates.
Moving to the beneficial aspects of CDS, empirical investigations address whether credit
insurance helped improve credit conditions. Hirtle (2008) asks to what extent the ability
to spread credit risk outside the banking system allowed banks to originate and hold more
credit. Running bank-level regressions of credit supply on credit derivatives usage, they
observe that all lending conditions improve (maturity more than volume and spreads) but
only for a certain type and size of borrower: large term loans. This suggests that the firms
most benefited by banks’ usage of credit derivatives are those potential reference entities.
On the same grounds, Ashcraft and Santos (2009) studies credit conditions around the
CDS trade initiation for each (non-financial) firm. The prior is that both riskier and more
informationally opaque companies should benefit more from the introduction of CDS, since
they allow for better risk sharing, and information production and spreading. However, tak-
ing for granted the samples of CDS and non-CDS firms, their findings point to no benefit
for the average firm after the introduction of the CDS market. Moreover, it seems that safer
and more transparent firms see a small reduction in the spreads they pay. Although without
showing evidence, the authors argue that CDS markets could sever the (credit) link between
borrowers and creditors and that could lead to less monitoring, resulting in a worsening of
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credit condition, especially for riskier and more opaque firms.
Looking at leverage and maturity (instead of spreads), Saretto and Tookes (2011) per-
forms a similar exercise and finds that both dimensions are affected by the introduction of
CDS against a firm’s debt–increase of 14-27% and 0.7-1 year, respectively. They also find
that this effect is more pronounced during periods in which the supply of credit is more
constrained.
Finally, Kim (2011) gets at ex-ante benefits of the rise and development of the CDS mar-
ket that comes specifically from the change in the relation between creditors and debtors:
creditors of firms with strong position in renegotiations benefit more from the introduction of
CDS–which empowers creditors in such restructurings. Also using the introduction of CDS,
they evaluate how CDS spreads respond to changes in either CEO bargaining power or rene-
gotiations frictions. Estimates confirm that CDS initiation is associated with a decrease in
credit spreads only for firms in the top bracket of bargaining power proxies distributions.
Our working hypothesis conveys another plus for the occurrence of CDS. We ask if it is
possible that credit default swaps help alleviate the weight that the empty-creditor imposes
on firms with a CDS against their debt. We hypothesize that CDS offer incentives for dis-
tressed firms to assume less risks and prevent them from risk-shifting. Although firms in
the entire spectrum of financial health gain by having a CDS-induced improvement in credit
terms, distressed firms at the imminence of taking on riskier, negative-NPV projects may ben-
efit more when creditors purchase insurance. One channel is the boost in debt capacity. This
benefit of accessing external funds in better terms comes from the tougher hand in renegoti-
ations CDS grant to insured creditors, and the consequent reduction in the odds of strategic
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defaults advanced in Bolton and Oehmke (2011) and in Campello and Matta (2013) above.
Another channel through which the amount of CDS and its financial status interact
to affect risk exposure is borrowed from Campello and Matta (2012). It models creditors
choosing the amount of CDS protection to modulate their bargaining power in bad times
and shows how this impacts borrowers’ project risk choices. The starting point is that CDS
raises creditor’s bargaining power in renegotiations. Depending on the amount of insurance
they purchase, creditors commit to liquidate the firm whenever it asks for a revision the
debt contract terms. As a result, borrowers get less when creditors overinsure and would like
to avoid it. Since liquidation is not on creditors’ interest either, they overinsure only when
the odds of the firm having enough cash flow to make regular debt repayments are high.
Avoiding over-insurance by creditors, therefore, would be a matter of being able to afford
projects that pay less, riskier in a sense, which could be achieved only by firms with greater
net worth. In other words, distressed firms cannot take on riskier projects in response to the
amount of insurance purchased by creditors. Therefore, although all firms benefit from CDS
trading against their debt. However, the advances should not be the same for all firms, and
this should be reflected in different risk appetites depending on their financial status. As a
result, distressed firms with CDS against their debt would behave differently from distressed
firms without CDS with respect to risk exposure.
1.3 Research Design
We measure the risk-exposure-preventing effect of CDS proposed in the hypothesis above.
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Our story is intended for firms with CDS written against their debt, and we specifically test
if, in the presence of CDS, distressed firms decrease investments more prominently (or in-
crease less) than financially flexible firms when facing uncertain economic prospects. That
is not what we expect for firms without a CDS written on their debt.
All previous studies compare the outcomes between firms with CDS and firms without
CDS. However, firms with CDS could self select themselves into the CDS sample. Although it
is a nice feature of the CDS markets that targeted firms do not directly interfere with the de-
cision of writing a CDS against their debt, when purchasing insurance, creditors thoroughly
study firm’s financial conditions, assets in place and investment policies. It is, therefore,
likely that creditors and managers decisions feedback each other at this stage and it should
be accounted for when designing the empirical setup. In the first part of the analysis, we fol-
low the existing literature (Sareto and Tookes, 2011) and address the concern by constraining
the set of firms in the CDS sample to be such that creditors decision about whether they
should buy insurance is, to some extent, isolated from the managers’ financial and investment
choices that we are interested in. For that, we restrict the analysis to firms in the S&P500
index. These companies are well-known, big firms, so limiting the study to this set helps
containing the motives of, for instance, why a CDS would be written against their debt.
With this scope in mind, we describe the tests intended to assess the relation between
financial health status and the assumption of risks. We adapt the empirical setting in Eis-
dorfer (2008) that tests if managers in distressed firms choose to invest more in times of
uncertain economic prospects. As a result, risky, potentially negative NPV projects could
be added to firms’ portfolio and give rise to risk-shifting. The paper obtains empirical ev-
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idence of risk-shifting in financially troubled firms using this relation between investment
intensity and uncertainty. It tests whether there is a weaker negative (or even positive) rela-
tion between investment and market asset volatility in distressed firms. Also, it strengthens
the case for the risk-shifting hypothesis, by checking whether investment made by those firms
during periods of high forecasted asset volatility generate less value.
In our study, we want to test whether firms’ financial status interact with the manager’s
incentives to change its risk appetite because of CDS. More specifically, we test whether
there are differences in the relation between investment and financial status for different
levels of expected uncertainty, in the presence of CDS. Hence, we must add another “layer”
to Eisdorfer (2008) in order to single out the role played by CDS in the risk taking choices of
the more constrained firms. Importantly, we modify the framework in two significant ways.
First, Eisdorfer (2008) calculates Altman’s z-score throughout the entire sample period to
determine when a firm was in distress or not; The tests were then carried on subsamples
of (z-score based) healthy and distressed firms. Splitting firms according to their level of
financial status is common procedure in the corporate finance literature (uses cash holdings,
leverage, payout ratios as well). As our case is concerned, those conventional measures of
financial health would most likely affect simultaneously investment and risk taking choices
(or the other way around.) It would, therefore, be very difficult to determine empirically
what comes first (causal direction) or how much of the effect is due to differences in their
financial status. We address that concern by leaning on a measure that helps us better de-
fine an identification strategy and gauge the effect induced by CDS. Following Almeida et al.
(2011), we use the maturing amount of long-term debt in the year following the beginning of
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the 2007-2008 financial crisis; the more financially constrained firms are the ones with larger
amounts of debt maturing right after the crisis hit. This measure fits our purpose well since
it allows for an exogenous change on firms’ financial status and helps disentangling its role
from other forces. It separates firms whose amount of debt due is large–most likely with-
out tapping new sources of funding–and become constrained, from those whose repayment
amount do not significantly affect their investment policies. To our convenience, these are
exactly the firms for which we want to measure the effects CDS has on risk appetite. We
describe how we construct the variable in more detail below.
Second, but still related to the definition of financial status above, differently from Eisdor-
fer (2008), we cannot explore the time-series dimension of the data and compare investment
choices across different market expected volatility periods. Because we gauge the effect
around the beginning of financial crisis, the framework prevents us from using the time-
series variation–except, right before and right after. Hence, we must find enough variability
in the forecasted volatility of assets in the cross-sections. The obvious alternative is firm-level
forecasted asset volatility, which we adopt throughout the study.3
However, we have already hinted at the potential selection bias associated with gauging
the effect against the firms that do not have CDS. As described in the intervention evaluation
literature, the true treatment effect in our case would be measured against firms in the CDS
sample “without CDS written against its debt”. Of course, one individual firm cannot be
3Firm-level volatility could be subject to simultaneity bias; Intertwined choice of what assets to hold
and other firm policies could confound each other. In particular, firms’ financial conditions would lead their
investment plan and, consequently, asset volatility, making it difficult to measure the effect in which we are
interested. We describe later on ways to mitigate this concern. Additionally, we use industry forecasted
volatility to evaluate how uncertainty relates to investment.
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in both states at the same time and we can only observe firms either with or without CDS.
Hence, we gauge the effect on a more appropriate, “counterfactual” sample to mitigate the
concerns with the selection bias and validate our hypothesis.
The counterfactual exercise repeats the one described above on a time when the market
for CDS didn’t exist. We propose studying what variables help determine the occurrence of
CDS in the CDS sample (we use in the first part), then inferring what would be a CDS-like
sample at dates when there was no CDS outstanding and, finally, reestimating the effects of
financial status on the risks assumed by firms in the estimated CDS sample. Yet, there is no
established guidance for CDS determinants. The closer attempt was made in Aschcraft and
Santos (2009), who search within firms without a CDS, the ones that would better match
the entry dynamics of their (CDS) counter parties. They estimate a probit model where the
dependent variable is one if CDS starts trading in that period and zero otherwise (CDS firms
before they start trading and firms that remain not traded throughout the entire sample pe-
riod). The independent variables in the probit are: size, to control for the overall risk of the
firm; income, leverage, equity volatility, market-to-book, R&D and ratings, that proxy for
the risk of the debt. The parameter estimates are used in their non-CDS sample to assign
counterfactual first-trading dates using the highest predicted probability of trading in each
period. Since we are not concerned with the timing of the CDS market for each firm, we
just employ the procedure above on a cross-section of firms to build the sample of estimated
CDS at a particular point in time.
That is the second step in the counterfactual exercise: to estimate a CDS sample in a time
when no CDS was traded. In choosing that particular date, we emphasize that other impor-
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tant aspects of the original exercise should also remain: the exogenous variation in firms’ fi-
nancial status. In particular, identifying a group of firms that becomes financially constrained
after an unexpected, sudden shock before the CDS era is what we look for. Such blend is
present in Lemmon and Roberts (2010) study of the 1990 junk bond crisis. Certainly, the
CDS market was not in place. Also, the authors argument that there was a truly exogenous
cutback in the supply of capital for below-investment-grade firms–and that it influenced those
firms’ investment decisions. This squeeze in funding was a result of changes in the rating pol-
icy of the association of insurers (NAIC), the collapse of an important player in the market for
non-investment-grade securities, Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., and the passage of reforms
(FIRREA), that, among other things, prevented Savings and Loans companies (S&L) from
financing speculative-grade firms. In their own words, “In concert, these three events led
to the near disappearance of the market for below-investment-grade debt–both public and
private placements after 1989.” That is the time when we estimate the falsifying CDS sample.
The stage for the final step of the counterfactual is, therefore, set. As in Lemmon and
Roberts (2010), we gauge the effect produced on the firms that became financially constrained
after 1990, the below-investment grade firms, relative to firms that were not directly impli-
cated by the described events, the unrated firms, but restrict attention to those that are
estimated as having CDS. The implementation makes use of a propensity score to match
junk and unrated firms, and compares pairwise differences in investment both before and
after 1990, specifically for firms estimated to have CDS on their debt prior to 1990. When
we contrast the results obtained in each of the exercises, we validate the hypothesis that
attributtes the dissimilar behavior of distressed firms (from the healthy ones) towards risk
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exposure to the presence of CDS. In other words, observing no effect in the pre-CDS era
while establishing its significance around the financial crisis of 2007-2008, when CDS trading
was at its peak, qualifies CDS as the main factor enticing different risk-taking behaviors by
firms according to their financial health status.
Before moving to the empirical specifications and data issues associated with each of
these exercises, we explain in more detail how we construct the (exogenous) financial status
variable, the firm-level assets value and the expected volatility measure.
1.3.1 Exogenous financial status, asset value, and expected volatil-
ity
1.3.1.1 Measures of Firms’ Financial Status
The most critical variable in the study is the measure of firms’ financial status. Since we
are interested in the separating effect the amount of resources managers can pledge has on
investment choices (for CDS firms), we ought to use a clean measure of financial status.
It should, therefore, overcome the endogeneity issues associated with traditional measures
financial health.
For the period around the 2007-2008 crisis, we implement the idea advanced in Almeida
et al. (2011) and measure the financial status of firms using the proportion of long-term debt
maturing right after the beginning of the financial crisis. In their paper, they are interested
in the real effects of the 2007-2008 financial crisis and “identify heterogeneity in financial
contracting at the onset of the crisis by exploiting ex-ante variation in long-term debt ma-
turity structure.” That means they have come up with a measure to pinpoint the extent to
which firms became unexpectedly more constrained. Leaning on this variable we are able
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to study what happens to firms that were more affected around the beginning of the crisis
and compare their outcomes with the more steady ones in terms of financial status. This
comes at a cost, however, since it limits the time frame to those dates around the crisis and
no time-series features can be exploited.
Still, other benefits related to our specific question and empirical setup arise from the use
of such variable. Besides making room for a clean identification of the effects of CDS on the
risk profile firms can choose, it allows us to use the CDS information at times when the CDS
market is more mature for the majority of the firms. This is in contrast with previous studies
that measure outcomes around the beginning of the CDS trades for each firm (e.g., Ashcraft
and Santos (2009), Sareto and Tookes (2011)). In these studies, the CDS first-trade date
observed for a firm in the sample is used as a proxy for the beginning of the CDS market for
that firm. On the other hand, by measuring the effect when the CDS against a firm’s debt
is up for a while, this variable also takes into account the manager’s learning process about
how CDS would affect future financing and investment decisions–given that we study the
marginal project choice by the manager and how it relates to the lender’s insurance purchase
amount; In other words, we should not expect managers to know all consequences of having
CDS trading against the firm’s debt right after CDS trades take place; Internalizing and
reacting to the consequences of having CDS written against the firm’s debt is what allows
us to speculate about the effects of financial flexibility on the firm’s risk exposure.
To build this variable we start by defining a date (quarter) for the beginning of the 2007-
2008 financial crisis and collect the proportion of the long-term debt outstanding maturing
in the year(s) following the onset of the crisis. Many studies elect Fall 2007 as the beginning
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of the “panic” in the interbank liquidity and credit markets (e.g. Gorton (2008), Acharya et
al. (2009), Almeida et al. (2011).) Accordingly, we use the third quarter of 2007 as the date
around which we conduct the analysis. As for the data, we use Compustat: for a particular
date, dd1 is the amount of long-term debt expected to mature in the following year; dltt is
the total long-term debt maturing after one year. Hence, dd1 + dltt is the total long-term
debt outstanding. The financial status measure is then calculated as the percentage of debt
maturing in the following year: dd1/(dd1 + dltt).
As for the counterfactual sample around the junk bond crisis of 1990, the transformed in-
stitutional arrangement outlines the firms that become more constrained (below-investment
grade) and the ones that do not change their financial status (unrated). Hence, Standard &
Poor’s long-term debt rating is the variable we need to define the financial health dimension.
Finally, notice that both measures lead naturally to the definition of a treatment group
that unexpectedly experiments a tightening of its financial conditions, who we call Low FF
firms. On the other hand, firms in the control group (with small portions of long-term debt
maturing immediately after the crisis in the first case, or unrated firms in the second) do not
have their net worth significantly compromised, and are referred to as the High FF firms.
We will use this terminology in our quantitative exercises below.
1.3.1.2 Measure of Assets Value
Start with the justification for using asset instead of equity volatility
The starting point for forecasting firms and industry assets volatility is a measure of firm’s
asset value. Market asset values can also be used to construct variables such as size and
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Tobin’s q. Hence, we estimate the market value of firms’ total assets (and its volatility) using
a two non-linear equation system based on Merton (1974). It views a firm’s capital structure
through the option-pricing framework of Black and Scholes (1973); Equity is an European
call option on firm’s total assets value with strike price equal to the book value debt. This
structural model has served a variety of purposes both for academics (e.g. Vassalou and
Xing, 2004) and practitioners (Moody’s KMV).
The first equation is the Black and Scholes (1973) formula
VE = VAN(d1)−BDe−rTN(d2) (1.1)
where Ve is the market value of equity, Va is the market value of assets, and BD is the
book value of debt; N(.) is the cumulative standard normal distribution and d1 and d2 are
functions of Va, BD, risk free rate (r), assets volatility (Sa) and time to maturity of debt (T).
The second equation, the optimal hedge formula derived from Ito’s lemma, states a re-
lation between equity volatility, Se, and asset volatility, Sa.
σE =
VAN(d1)σA
VE
(1.2)
We solve these two equations simultaneously for each firm and date to get time-series
estimates of both Va and Sa.4
1.3.1.3 Measure of Forecasted Volatility
Contrasting the sensitivity of investment to financial status within each of the samples of
high and low forecasted volatility is the goal of our exercise. We obtain expected returns
4More detail about this procedure in the Appendix A.
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volatility using a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity model, GARCH
(1,1), on asset returns– from asset values as estimated in the previous section. However, given
that GARCH estimated volatility is driven mainly by stock returns (especially negative ones
during crises), high volatility firms should be the ones that experienced negative shocks.
These firms would have less investment opportunities and invest even less if financially con-
strained. Hence, in order to prevent the forecasted volatility from contamination from the
periods ahead, we use in the GARCHs information up to the period before we build high
and low expected volatility samples. That way, for each firm and period in the sample we
have the year-ahead forecasted volatility, conditional on information available right before
the beginning of that period. The heterogeneity in the cross-section of forecasted volatility
before the crises are used to build samples based on these levels of uncertainty. 5
1.3.2 Empirical Setup
Our empirical setups retain the simple idea for evaluating the difference in managers’ risk
appetite–relating investment levels and expected volatility–but introduces authentic exoge-
nous variations in firms’ financial health status around the crises. Given that the nature
of the shocks used in each exercise weakens the financial status of firms in the treatment
group (distressed firms), the suggested framework is to use Diff-in-Diff estimators to eval-
uate whether CDS makes it more difficult for more constrained firms to risk exposures as
compared to the more financially flexible ones. Stated in terms of the variables we construct:
5In order to get estimates of the expected industry returns volatility, we first build industries’ returns
using value-weighted average returns for firms within each two-digit SIC code industry, for every period in
the sample–we consider all industries with at least 5 firms in each month. Then apply GARCH (1,1) for
each industry return series to get year-ahead forecasted volatility for every period in the sample.
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H1: In the presence of CDS, firms’ investment response to financial status changes is
more pronounced where the volatility is expected to be higher, with constrained firms showing
more negative reactions.
Notice that, were the scenarios we study not crises events, there would be no reason to
expect negative responses. It would be sufficient that the effect for the distressed firms were
less positive, if more flexible firms’ investments went up in times of high uncertainty–again,
indicating that more flexible firms risk-shift while constrained firms are kept from doing so.
Perhaps, it is more important to realize that H1 actually makes two statements: First, con-
strained firms’ investment behavior should be different from more financially flexible firms’
in high uncertainty situations–but not so when uncertainty is less pronounced. Second, in
the high uncertainty level state, where asset substitution incentives are stronger, constrained
firms are prevented from taking on potentially riskier projects.
1.4 Sample Construction and Empirical Results
1.4.1 The financial crisis of 2007-2008
We start the analysis of the effect of CDS around the financial crisis of 2007-2008 with firms
that have been listed in the S&P500 index from Compustat since 2002.6 As we mentioned
earlier, we choose S&P500 companies for the sake of homogeneity, since there would be
a plethora of reasons explaining the level of risk, the decision regarding indebtedness and
the existence of CDS in the whole spectrum of firms. Moreover, several market analysts,
who follow S&P500 financing and investment choices closely, constantly evaluate the risks
6We start in 2002 in order to align the sample with the CDS sample from Bloomberg, who starts collecting
firm-level information about credit default swaps in that year.
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to which these firms are exposed. Therefore, we should not expect unconventional firm poli-
cies driving the decisions for this group of firms. We also filter out financial, governmental,
and utilities companies since their capital structures and investment decisions could differ
a lot from other firms in the rest of economy. For these firms we get quarterly Compustat
financial and ratings data. Hence, for each firm-quarter in our sample we have demograph-
ical (e.g., size, industry) and financial (e.g., assets, cash, long and short-term debt, ratings,
investment) characteristics.
We then turn to Bloomberg in order to get information on CDS for each of these firms–
using CUSIPs. Bloomberg CDS data on corporations’ debt starts in 2002, which makes us
restrict the entire sample to observation from 2002 onward. For those CUSIPs with both a
valid match and data on CDS , we collect daily information on tenure, seniority, and bid/ask
quotes and dates. We keep only the CDS written on senior debt and 5-year maturity since
they are the most actively traded instruments. The sample of CDS firms we use throughout
the paper comprehends the firms that are more actively traded, i.e., are quoted at least 25
days in the quarter.
In our statistical exercise, the CDS sample is further restricted to those firms whose CDS
remain active after the start of the financial crisis. This is important for two reasons: first,
the more financially constrained firms could have their CDS trades frozen after the crisis and
selection bias would affect the results. Second, observing CDS trades starting around the
crisis should also make us skeptical about its relation with the firm’s financial status. Hence,
we want to concentrate on firms that show regular CDS activity throughout the years of
2007 and 2008.
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Finally, in order to estimate the Black-Scholes (B-S) equations and forecast volatilities
we need information on firm-level equity returns and volatility. Here we start with monthly
observations from CRSP and time-series go back to the date the firm first appeared on Com-
pustat, since the B-S solution uses other financial information.7 The outcomes of the two
supporting procedures, B-S and GARCH, are build into the quarterly database through the
CRSP-Compustat link.
Our main specifications compare outcomes around the beginning of the financial crisis,
2007Q3. More precisely, we consider the quarter immediately before the crisis, 2007Q2, and
the same quarter in the following year, 2008Q2. Using the same quarter before and after
the shock help freeing the comparisons from seasonal characteristics of the cycle. After all
the cleaning process, there are 342 firms in the dataset–225 with CDS and 117 that have
never had a CDS written against their debt. Restraining observations further to the periods
around the financial crisis, brings these figures down to 181 firms in the CDS sample and 70
firms in the non-CDS sample.
Table 1 brings some descriptive statistics for all firms in S&P500 as a benchmark in
Panel A, and for the dates around the beginning of the crisis, contrasting CDS and non-CDS
firms (Panels B-C). Firms in the restricted sample are larger than S&P500 firms, with CDS
firms being the largest among all. Limiting attention to the restricted samples, financial
characteristics such as cash, leverage, and cash flow are different between CDS and non-CDS
firms but it is hard to tell which sample is more constrained. For instance, higher cash levels
could compensate lower cash flows. On the other hand, tangibility and Q both suggest CDS
7Time-series start as early as 1962 for some firms, date at which Compustat data becomes more reliable.
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firms are less subject to risk-shifting incentives since they have more tangible assets and less
investment opportunities. Finally, the proportion of debt due when the crisis hit is about
the same for all samples. The distributions show that firms are reasonably unconstrained,
but in the top quartile they have at least 20% of their debt due right after the crisis. And,
although we balance these characteristics across samples, if anything, they should bias the
results against our hypothesis.
We first test H1 using Diff-in-Diffs around the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The following
specification is used in subsamples of high and low expected volatility.8
∆Investment = α + δ%LT Debt due+ ΓControls+ u (1.3)
We regress the after-before difference in investment on the firm’s financial status, %LT Debt due,
which takes value 1 and 0 for firms in the top and bottom terciles of the (beginning of) 2007Q2
distribution of % of long-term-debt maturing in the following year. The constant α measures
the difference in investment levels after-before for firms with the bottom proportion of debt
due. δ is the parameter of interest and it measures how sensitivethe changes in investment
(relative to the period before the crisis) are to the financial status of the firms. Since we run
this regression separately on samples of high and low expected volatility, we evaluate the
separating effect CDS has on firms’ financial status for different economic forecasted environ-
ments and expect it to be more prominent where the risk-shifting investments are stronger.
In our exercise, this is consistent with a negative δ for the high expected volatility sample, in-
8The sample is split in half, being the top half, the high expected volatility sample and the bottom
half, the low forecasted volatility sample. Unreported results show estimates for the high and low volatility
samples as the top and bottom terciles of the forecasted volatility distribution. Although the number of
observations are reduced, the results do not change significantly.
23
dicating that the presence of CDS would restrain more constrained firms from risky activities,
where it matters more; and a weaker effect (or zero) for the low expected volatility sample.
Table 2 presents Eq.(1.3) parameter estimates for CDS firms. Panel A and Panel B
present Diff-in-Diff estimates of actual firm-level investment for the samples of high and low
forecasted volatility, respectively. The first thing to notice is that the constant α is not
statistically significant, suggesting that more financially flexible firms are able to maintain
their investment policy throughout the crisis period. More importantly, however, Panel A
shows negative, statistically significantcoefficients for %LT Debt due; suggesting that firms
in industries that face higher uncertainties respond according to their financial status, the
more constrained ones refraining from engaging in riskier activities than the more finan-
cially flexible ones. Taken together, the magnitudes of the parameters indicate thatmore
constrained firms decrease their investment around 5.5p.p. more than firms in the bottom
quartile. Adding controls for achieving better equilibrium on the characteristics of the firms
we compare, does not affect the results.9
Panel B of Table 2 presents the same regressions for the sample of Low Expected Volatilty.
It complements the story by showing that CDS firms financial status does not play a role in
this case. These result, although based on a small sample, do not allow one to discard the
discriminating effect CDS has on project’s risk choice, through its financial status–more con-
strained firms having to pick the safer ones where financial prospects are uncertain. Hence,
for the CDS sample, the financial status affects the firms’ risk exposure; CDS prevents the
firms in financial trouble from investing in times of uncertainty, when risk-shifting is more
9Other specifications were tested and resulted in similar outcomes. We present here the ones more in line
with the one presented in Eisdorfer (2008).
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likely.
1.4.2 The junk-bond crisis of 1990
The counterfactual exercise for H1 follows Lemmon and Roberts (2010) in that the empirical
results are obtained contrasting directly the investment outcomes of CDS, below-investment
grade (treated) and unrated (control) firms, both before (1986-1989) and after (1990-1993).
The starting point for the sample is, therefore, all non-financial firm-year observations in
Compustat from 1986 to 1993. Observations are required to have nonmissing data for book
assets, net debt issuances, investment, and market-to-book ratio. Also, as with the previ-
ous sample we trim all ratios at the upper and lower percentiles to mitigate the influence
of extreme observations. Finally, we categorize firms in treatment and control groups using
S&P’s long-term credit rating. According to S&P definitions, firms rated BBB- or higher are
investment grade, firms rated BB+ or lower are below-investment grade, and firms without
a rating by S&P are the unrated.10
Table 3 presents summary statistics of selected variables for the different rating cate-
gories during the period 1986-1993. It reveals imbalances in several dimensions that should
be “corrected” in order to allow for proper comparison between treated and untreated firms.
Among these we remark (retelling findings from Lemmon and Roberts (2010)), junk firms
issue more debt and have higher leverage than both investment-grade and unrated firms.
Compared to unrated firms, junk firms are much larger and much more profitable–which
sort of justify their greater indebtedness.
10Observations with ratings “N.M.”, “SD”, and “Suspended” are not considered.
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Just as before, we estimate Diff-in-Diffs. Here, we compare investment policies of junk
bond issuers and unrated firms both before and after the 1990 shock. The procedure is
intended to eliminate permanent differences between the two groups and shifts in demand
eventually associated with the change in the economic environment for speculative-grade
firms. However, as suggested by the previous table, the samples differ along many di-
mensions and we are interested exclusively in the effect caused by firms’ financial status.
Although the events around 1990 turn below-investment-grade firms into constrained firms
while keeping unrated firms’ financial health unchanged, one must harmonize the other di-
mensions between treatment status so the resulting change outcome (investment) could be
attributed to the level of financial status. That is attained with a propensity score matching
on variables of interest prior to 1990.
The propensity score matching produces balanced treated (below-investment-grade) and
matched control (unrated) samples, on which the Diff-in-Diffs are estimated. Table 4 presents
the results for the investment policy. Panel A uses the entire matched sample of junk and
unrated firms, and Panel B uses a sample of CDS-junk and matched unrated. Each panel
presents the average differences between the post-1989 period and the pre-1990 period (mean)
and its standard error (se). The mean is computed by first calculating the average investment
after 1990 and then subtracting the average investment before 1990 for each firm. This differ-
ence is then averaged over below-investment-grade firms (column Junk). A similar procedure
is performed for the matched unrated firms (column Unrated). Finally, we get the treatment
effect by subtracting from the averaged difference of the below-investment-grade group the
averaged difference of the unrated group (column Diff-in-Diff)–and respective p-values of the
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null hypothesis that the estimate is zero. In Panel B, we further split the sample below and
above the median value of forecasted volatility so we can better compare the counterfactual
results with our main results–and p-values for the difference between averages in high and
low expected volatility samples.
In Panel A of Table 4, we report estimates for the main specification in Lemmon and
Roberts (2010). Our results mimic theirs, pointing to firms that became more constrained
during the 1990 junk bond crisis cut down net investment relative to unrated firms by 4.1%.
At the same time, although both below-investment-grade and unrated firms decrease their
capital expenditures (investments) after the shock, it doesn’t seem to the the mechanism
through which the decrease in net investment operates, since they are not statistically dif-
ferent from zero–nor is the Diff-inDiff.11
However, Panel B shows a different pattern in investments for a sample where the treat-
ment group is restricted to junk firms that are estimated to have CDS written against their
debt. First, the Diff-in-Diff estimate suggests that junk firms behave differently from unrated
firms in terms of their capital expenditures. Junk-CDS firms do not restraint investment
relative to unrated firms despite the dramatic dry out of funds associated with the events
around 1990–1% increase, actually; An inspection of each group separately reveals that,
while junk-CDS firms managed to keep their investment policies steady, unrated firms cut
investments throughout the bond crisis. Panels B1 and B2 further show that CDS-junk firms
financial status effect are not different between the expected volatility levels12.
11Acquisitions is the channel through which the reduction in net investments operate.
12In unreported results, we repeat the procedures we did in Panel B for a sample where besides restricting
treated firms to CDS-junk we also restrict the untreated to be CDS-unrated and reach similar conclusions.
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Although applied to different treated and non-treated subjects, these are essentially the
same Diff-in-Diffs we performed around the financial crisis of 2007-2008. There we found
that constrained firms with CDS actually traded against their debt refrain from risk-shifiting.
Here, however, when CDS were not even thought of, firms with characteristics that resemble
actually traded CDS firms do not respond (differently) according to their financial status.
These two results combined favors the hypothesis that CDS makes constrained firms more
cautious in their investment decisions when the economic environment is cloudy. CDS would
then have a dampening effect in the economy in times of distress by restricting the portfolio
of projects that constrained firms, the ones more likely to fail, could take on.
This stabilizing feature adds to other potential benefits of CDS discussed in the literature.
For instance, CDS concurs for an increased availability of financing in the economy in good
times (Bolton and Oehmke, 2011, Campello and Matta, 2011). In adverse times, however, the
empty creditor problem kicks in and distressed firms are pushed into bankruptcy inefficiently.
Our results suggest that, by preventing constrained firms to invest “mistakenly”, and conse-
quently not entering distress, CDS helps mitigate what is referred as its most harmful effect,
the empty-creditor problem. CDS itself alleviates the empy-creditor problem it gives rise to.
Moreover, our results also speak to Eisdorfer (2008)’s evidence that distressed firms are
more inclined to risk-shifting. Our estimates somewhat refine that statement and suggest
that, among the distressed firms, the ones with a CDS written against their debt are less
prone to engage in risk-shifting.
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1.5 Robustness
The results for the CDS and non-CDS samples already offer evidence for the differential
effect financial status has on risk-shifting. In this section we provide further support to our
claim by replicating similar tests in a situation where no exogenous change in financial health
is expected (placebo crisis).
1.5.1 Placebo Crisis
In times when there is no sudden shock to firms financial status, we do not expect financial
status to discriminate the investment-uncertainty sensitivity for CDS firms although, accord-
ing to the model, for financially flexible firms risk-shifting could be present. To test that,
in Table 5 we repeat the analysis for a placebo crisis date. It uses observations in 2005Q2
(before) and 2006Q2 (after), as if a crisis occurred between these dates, to find out whether
the exogeneity of the measure of financial flexibility matters or not.
Table 5 shows Diff-in-Diff parameter estimates for samples of CDS firms for each level of
financial status. The results show a much weaker effect of financial flexibility on firm’s risk
taking choices than the one found around the crisis (Table 2, Panel A). Moreover, the signs
for the double interaction suggest no differential effect according to financial status though
none of them is significant.
Were these results more vigorous, they would suggest that concentrating on dates around
the financial crisis of 2007-2008 (or any other unforeseen changes in firms’ financial prospects)
gives some credibility to the identification strategy and supports the hypothesis of a mono-
tonic relation between financial status and risk-shifting in the presence of CDS.
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1.6 Concluding Remarks
Although CDS stands as the most important financial innovation of recent years, there
remains a lot of debate about what contracting inefficiencies they address, whether they af-
fect the availability of credit in the economy, or with what incentives they provide managers.
We claim that CDS affects the projects risk choices depending on the firms’ financial status,
being distressed firms more restrained than financially flexible ones. That is the prediction
we take to the data using actual CDS trades around the financial crisis of 2007-2008, and a
counterfactual CDS sample around the junk bond crisis of 1990.
We find evidence in favor of the discriminating effect of CDS on risk exposure. The
empirical strategy privileges an unexpected variation in firms’ financial status, the sudden
change in financial conditions caused by the advent of the financial crisis of 2007-2008. It
measures firms’ response in terms of investments for different expected economic outcomes
in the presence of CDS. Results suggest that distressed firms with CDS outstanding refrain
more prominently from engaging in risky enterprises than more financially flexible firms.
In order to guarantee that the presence of CDS is what drives those results, we account
for selection bias by “repeating” the exercise in a counterfactual-like setup where we measure
the effect in a time when CDS were not available. In that sample we use another sudden
shock to firms’ financial status, the 1990 junk-bond crisis, and estimate what would be the
effect on an inferred sample of CDS firms around that period–using information from the
sample in the more recent crisis, when CDS were actually traded. The estimates around the
1990 crisis suggest that CDS, distressed firms do not behave differently from their healthy
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counterparties. It reinforces the results found for the 2007-2008 crisis. That is, CDS seem
to play a role in affecting the investment decisions of firms with regard to risk exposure and
our empirical frameworks allow us to tell one side of the story: that CDS prevents managers
in financially constrained firms from risk-shifting.
Such an interesting result combines with other pluses CDS introduces in the economy.
Beyond reducing transaction costs, CDS are thought to affect the relation between creditors
and debtors. For example, it could ease financing in times of prosperous economic activity
since over insurance stimulates the choice of safer projects, which increases firms repayment
capacity. When the economic outlook is poor, preventing distressed firms from risk-shifting
is also a nice feature of CDS since these are the firms more likely to go bankrupt. These are
times when the empty-creditor plays a role acts and pushes the firm into bankruptcy unnec-
essarily. Hence, by keeping distressed firms from becoming insolvent and triggering credit
events, CDS could mitigate the empty-creditor problem it gives rise to and, as a consequence,
have a stabilizing effect in economic downturns.
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1.7 Tables
Panel&A.&S&P500&Firms&Descriptive&StatisticsMean SD 2nd&Quartile 3rd&Quartile 4th&QuartileSize 9.12 1.06 8.26 9.05 9.86Leverage 0.19 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.26Cash&flow 0.25 0.23 0.11 0.19 0.33Tangibility 0.28 0.21 0.13 0.22 0.38Tobins'&Q 1.63 0.81 0.97 1.49 2.14Investment 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.07%&LQT&debt&due 0.09 0.17 0.00 0.03 0.10Panel&B.&CDS&Firms&(restricted&around&the&crisis)Mean SD 2nd&Quartile 3rd&Quartile 4th&QuartileSize 9.25 0.96 8.52 9.23 9.90Leverage 0.20 0.11 0.12 0.19 0.27Cash&flow 0.23 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.31Tangibility 0.30 0.22 0.13 0.24 0.43Tobins'&Q 1.51 0.79 0.93 1.35 1.95Investment 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.07%&LQT&debt&due 0.08 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.11Panel&C.&nonQCDS&Firms&(restricted&around&the&crisis)Mean SD 2nd&Quartile 3rd&Quartile 4th&QuartileSize 8.74 1.22 7.79 8.35 9.74Leverage 0.16 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.23Cash&flow 0.33 0.34 0.13 0.25 0.38Tangibility 0.23 0.18 0.12 0.18 0.27Tobins'&Q 1.91 0.81 1.17 1.88 2.49Investment 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.08%&LQT&debt&due 0.11 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.10
Table&1
Descriptive&Statistics&for&the&S&P500&Sample&and&the&Sample&Restricted&Around&the&Financial&Crisis&
of&2007B2008The table shows firm's characteristics for two different samples: S&P500 sample as a benchmark (Panel A) and the samplerestricted around the crisis (2007Q2 and 2008Q2)QQPanels B and C for the CDS and nonQCDS samples, and Panels D and E forobservations before and after the financial crisis shock. It shows information about the mean, standard deviation, and the midQquintiles, respectively for each variable. The variables are: Size, the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets;Leverage, defined as longQterm debt divided by total assets; Cash flow, measured as the ratio of operating income cash flow toPPE at the beginning of the period; Tangibility, as PPE divided by total assets; Tobins' Q measured as the market value of assetsdivided&by&total&assets;&and&the&financial&status&measure:&the&ratio&of&longQterm&debt&due&in&the&following&year&to&longQterm&debt.
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(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
%	  LT	  Debt	  Due -­‐0.0574* -­‐0.0565* -­‐0.0545* -­‐0.0181 -­‐0.0433 -­‐0.0500(0.0305) (0.0311) (0.0319) (0.0354) (0.0478) (0.0515)Size -­‐0.000457 -­‐0.000228 0.00237 0.00143(0.00286) (0.00310) (0.00284) (0.00298)Tangibility 0.0197 0.0196(0.0230) (0.0121)Tobin's	  Q -­‐0.00200 -­‐0.00330 0.00202 0.000559(0.00654) (0.00658) (0.00368) (0.00331)Leverage -­‐0.0454 -­‐0.0385 0.0361* 0.0406*(0.0427) (0.0434) (0.0205) (0.0215)Lagged	  Cashflow 0.0378 0.0955 -­‐0.0160 0.0382(0.0457) (0.0670) (0.0302) (0.0556)Altman's	  Z-­‐score -­‐0.0140* -­‐0.0118 0.00213 0.000681(0.00758) (0.00747) (0.00605) (0.00610)Constant -­‐0.0131 0.0302 0.0121 0.00293 -­‐0.0318 -­‐0.0329(0.0487) (0.0401) (0.0456) (0.00229) (0.0335) (0.0338)Observations 37 37 37 39 35 35R-­‐squared 0.124 0.230 0.253 0.008 0.123 0.191Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1
Panel	  A.	  High	  Expected	  Vol. Panel	  B.	  Low	  Expected	  Vol.
Table	  2
Diff-­‐in-­‐Diff	  Regressions	  of	  Investment	  Intensity	  on	  Financial	  Status	  Around	  the	  Financial	  Crisis	  of	  
2007-­‐2008	  for	  Samples	  of	  CDS	  FirmsThe dependent variable is change in firm-­‐specific actual investment intensity, proxied as the ratio of capital expenditures in agiven quarter to PPE at the beginning of the same quarter. The independent variables are 1) a binary variable that splits thesample in before and after the financial crisis of 2007-­‐2008; more specifically it compares 2007Q2 with 2008Q2. 2) the firmfinancial status at the beginning of each quarter-­‐-­‐and its interaction with the dummy variable, and 3) a set of covariates. Thecovariates are size, proxied by the natural logarithm of the market value of firms (estimated by the Black-­‐Scholes procedure);tangibility, measured as the ratio of PPE to Total Assets; market-­‐to-­‐Book, measured as the equity market value divided by equitybook value; leverage, measured as the book value of long-­‐term debt divided by total assets; and cash flow, as measured by theratio of operating cash flows to PPE at the beginning of the quarter. Results are presented separately for the High ExpectedVolatility (Panel A) and Low Expected Volatility (Panel B) samples-­‐-­‐top and bottom halves of the forecasted volatility distributionat the end of 2006 (which we estimate using the GARCH(1,1) model separately for each firm asset returns), within the sample offirms with CDS traded against their debt. The table presents regression-­‐estimated coefficients and robust standard error (inparenthesis).
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Variables
Investment	  
Grade
Junk
Unrated
Investment	  
Grade
Junk
Unrated
Panel	  A.	  Source	  of	  funds
Net	  LT	  debt	  issues
0.02
0.04
0.01
0.02
0.05
0.01
Net	  equity	  issues
0.00
0.03
0.05
0.00
0.03
0.05
Cash	  flow
0.05
0.00
-­‐0.02
0.12
0.08
0.05
Panel	  B.	  Use	  of	  funds
Net	  investment
0.10
0.10
0.09
0.10
0.11
0.09
Investment
0.09
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
Acquisitions
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.02
Sale	  of	  PPE
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
Change	  in	  inventory
-­‐0.01
-­‐0.01
-­‐0.01
-­‐0.01
-­‐0.01
-­‐0.01
Panel	  C.	  Firm	  characteristics
Market	  leverage
0.33
0.49
0.27
0.33
0.51
0.26
log(Sales)
7.43
5.83
3.74
7.82
6.04
3.70
Market-­‐to-­‐book
1.10
1.08
1.50
1.12
1.06
1.60
Profitability
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.15
0.10
0.04
Tangibility
0.51
0.38
0.33
0.48
0.37
0.32
Atman's	  Z-­‐score
1.82
1.30
1.16
1.85
1.32
0.95
Firms
648
692
6459
738
744
6321
Our	  samples
LR	  original	  samples
Table	  3
Sum
m
ary	  Statistics	  for	  Com
pustat	  Sam
ples-­‐-­‐Com
pared	  to	  O
riginal	  LR	  Sam
ples
Table4presentsaveragesforvariablesforthreesubsamplesofannualCompustatfortheperiod1986-­‐1993accordingtolong-­‐termS&P
ratings.ValuesforboththesamplesweconstructandtheoriginalLemmonandRoberts(JFQA,2010)samplesarepresentedonforthe
sakeofcomparison.TheInvestmentGradesamplesaredefinedasallinvestmente-­‐grade-­‐firm-­‐yearobservations(i.e.,BBB-­‐andabove),
Junksamplesconsistofbelow-­‐investment-­‐grade-­‐firm-­‐yearobservations(i.e,BB+andbelow),andUnratedsamplescompriseallthe
observations	  without	  a	  credit	  rating.	  	  All	  variables	  are	  defined	  in	  the	  Appendix.
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Junk Unrated Diff-­‐in-­‐DiffPanel	  A.	  Original	  LR	  SampleNet	  investment mean -­‐0.042 -­‐0.002 -­‐0.041se 0.002 0.015 0.019p-­‐value	  (Junk-­‐Unrated) 0.01Firms 76 52Investment mean -­‐0.013 -­‐0.003 -­‐0.011se 0.007 0.001 0.009p-­‐value	  (Junk-­‐Unrated) 0.11Firms 82 61Panel	  B.	  CDS	  firms	  matched	  freelyInvestment mean 0.006 -­‐0.003 0.009se 0.005 0.002 0.005p-­‐value	  (Junk-­‐Unrated) 0.04Firms 20 33Panel	  B1.	  High	  Expected	  volatilityInvestment mean 0.006se 0.008Panel	  B2.	  Low	  Expected	  volatilityInvestment mean 0.001se 0.006p-­‐value	  (B1	  -­‐	  B2) 0.31
Table	  4
The	  Response	  of	  Investment	  to	  the	  Supply	  ShockTable 5 presents propensity score matched differences in investment for junk and unrated firms. Panel Auses a propensity score sampl of matched junk (BB+ and lower) and unrated firms throughout the sampleperiod, 1986-­‐1990-­‐-­‐after the filters guaranteeing no switch swithch between rating status and at least oneobservation before and after 1989 have been applied. Panel B further restrain Panel A's Junk sample tofirms with a CDS (estimated from the 2007-­‐2008 crisis period). For panel B the CDS-­‐Junk sample is furthersplit into High expected volatility and Low expected volatility to be compared with the sensitivitiescalculated for the 2007-­‐2008 crisis period. The table presents the average difference (mean) between thepost-­‐1989 period and the pre-­‐1990 era; the standard error of the mean difference (se); the p-­‐value for theDiff-­‐in-­‐Diff (Junk -­‐ Unrated); and the number of firms used in each setup. Specifically for the subsamples ofHigh and Low expected volatility, the table brings the p-­‐value of the difference between their means.Robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  employed	  in	  the	  estimation	  of	  the	  propensity	  scores.
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(1) (2) (1) (2)After	  2007Q3 -­‐0.0169 -­‐0.0414 0.00861 -­‐0.00957(0.0452) (0.0511) (0.0320) (0.0319)Expected	  vol. 0.253 0.102 0.863** 0.739*(0.635) (0.527) (0.323) (0.398)After	  2007Q3	  ×	  Expected	  vol. 0.215 0.624 0.0318 0.366(0.812) (0.788) (0.662) (0.687)Size 0.00241 -­‐0.00523(0.00569) (0.00539)Tangibility 0.00192 0.0104(0.0333) (0.0346)Market-­‐to-­‐Book -­‐0.000370* 0.00166(0.000217) (0.00256)Leverage 0.0294 0.0370(0.0404) (0.0509)Lagged	  Cashflow 0.0475 0.0692(0.0299) (0.0448)Constant 0.0442 0.0103 -­‐0.000863 0.0304(0.0345) (0.0615) (0.0171) (0.0743)Observations 51 44 49 41R-­‐squared 0.020 0.159 0.206 0.317
Table	  5
Diff-­‐in-­‐Diff	  Regressions	  of	  Investment	  intensity	  on	  Industries	  Expected	  Volatility	  
Around	  Placebo	  Dates
Healthy	  firms
***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1
CDS	  sample
The dependent variable is firm-­‐specific actual investment intensity, proxied as the ratio of capitalexpenditures in a given quarter to PPE at the beginning of the same quarter. The independent variablesare 1) a binary variable that splits the sample in before and after the placebo date; more specifically itcompares 2006Q2 with 2007Q2. 2) the expected industry volatility at the beginning of each quarter,which we estimate using the GARCH(1,1) model separately to the average monthly return of eachindustry (two-­‐digit SIC code)-­‐-­‐and its interaction with the dummy variable, and 3) a set of covariates.The covariates are size, proxied by the natural logarithm of the market value of firms (estimated by theBlack-­‐Scholes procedure); tangibility, measured as the ratio of PPE to Total Assets; market-­‐to-­‐Book,measured as the equity market value divided by equity book value; leverage, measured as the book valueof	  long-­‐term	  debt	  divided	  by	  total	  assets;	  and	  	  cash	  flow,	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  ratio	  of	  operating	  cash	  flows	  to PPE at the beginning of the quarter. Results are presented for the CDS sample. It shows estimates forthe financially flexible and distressed firms-­‐-­‐bottom and top quartiles of the % of LT Debt due,	  respectively. The table presents regression-­‐estimated coefficients and robust standard error (inparenthesis).
Distressed	  firms
Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses
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Chapter 2
Liquidity Management Instruments in
Emerging Markets: Evidence from
Brazil
2.1 Introduction
Liquidity management is a critical element in a firm’s financial strategy1. Recent surveys
in the academic literature have pointed out that both the appropriate levels of corporate
liquidity as well as the channels through which it will be available to the firm are the most
important decisions a CFO makes. Yet, we don’t know much about how those levels are
defined or what makes managers choose one instrument over another when setting the firm’s
liquidity policy. The use of cash and credit lines has been documented, but only recently
more detailed data on the latter became available and a clearer picture just started to emerge.
The literature on cash holdings suggests that transactional and financial frictions, and
agency problems are the main reasons behind the firms’ liquidity policies. Empirical stud-
ies looking at cash policies confirm those hypotheses to a great extent. Nevertheless, fully
1Disclaimer: The views and opinion expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the official policy or position of the Brazilian Central Bank.
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committed credit lines are prescribed by the theory as substitutes for cash. Data on credit
lines, however, reveals that, in practice, firms do not have full discretion over the use of the
lines. Understanding how firms manage liquidity requires a better knowledge about how
these instruments work together and how should the firms choose between them.
In this paper we characterize the liquidity management of non-financial firms operating
in Brazil. We do that by looking at the recent figures for cash and bank lines of credit,
describing the firm’s characteristics related with the use of each of these instruments and
trying to explain the choices firms make between them with the existing literature. Since
this is the first study that encompasses liquidity instruments other than cash in emerging
market economies, we take the time to describe how the market for credit lines is organized
and how the features of the domestic arrangements could affect the management of liquidity.
In order to accomplish the task, we managed to build a unique dataset joining the Brazil-
ian firm’s balance sheet and the bank loans data. It was only possible because of the release of
the new forms required by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil (CVM). These
forms allow us to reconcile the cash information from the consolidated financial statements
with the credit lines available to the subsidiaries. First, we gather balance sheet data for all
firms listed from 2002 to 2011 in Economatica. Second, after hand collecting the organiza-
tional structure for a selected group of firms (3010 subsidiaries for 122 firms), we incorporate
the loans data, in particular the information about the unused portion of the credit lines.
This makes the resulting dataset one of the first available for studying broader liquidity
management issues in emerging market economies-among other corporate finance topics.
There are several reasons why it would be interesting to look at the liquidity manage-
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ment of firms in Brazil. First, almost all research is based on developed markets. Although
many papers investigate the role of cash in different settings and countries, the empirical
literature on credit lines is mainly restricted to the U.S–where markets are reasonably well
established and the frictions minimized. Learning how these liquidity management tools op-
erate in an environment where institutions are still evolving could help us get at some of the
unanswered questions. Certainly, credit markets in Brazil have gone through deep reforms
in the beginning of this century, easing significantly the access to credit. In aggregate terms,
it represented an increase on total loans from 25% to almost 50% of the GDP since then.
Those changes may have affected they way firms manage liquidity through the relative cost
of holding cash.
Second, the data is available. Empirical research on credit lines flourished only recently
with the ‘discovery” of datasets that gather information for a large cross–section of firms.
Hence, few datasets on credit lines are available. In Brazil, the central bank hosts the Brazil-
ian Credit Bureau (SCR), where data on all loans, including lines of credit, is recorded.
Banks must collect a range of characteristics of the outstanding loans and feed the SCR on
a monthly basis. We bring together the cash holdings and the undrawn portion of the credit
lines to study this broader concept of liquidity.
Another related reason is the lack of knowledge about what lines of credit really are.
Why do credit lines exist in the first place? What market failures do they address? Can we
improve on the current framework? How? These fundamental questions need to be answered
to provide a better understanding of about credit lines. Indeed, the lines of credit provided
by the Brazilian banks have particular features and could be of assistance. For instance,
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there is no fee structure; the lines of credit are granted to few, specific purposes, and are
contracted against collateral. Looking at these different arrangements could shed some light
on how to answer those questions.
Also, there is a lively debate in literature over the relevance of foreign profits taxes on
the recent cash built up in the United States. Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2007)
advocates that repatriation taxes help explain the cash accumulation in multinational firms.
Other papers, however, challenge that evidence showing that even the firms that do not have
operations abroad increased cash ratios. In our case, that should not be a problem. The cur-
rent Brazilian legislation on foreign profits taxes does not distinguish the origin of the profits,
that is, earnings are taxed the same regardless of the country in which they are generated.
Following the order in which the empirical literature has evolved, we present the results
in two steps: using the balance sheet data we describe the firm’s cash policies. Then, we add
the liquidity provided by the bank lines of credit and study the interaction between the two
policies. In the first set of results, we document the increase in the aggregate cash-to-assets
ratio from 6.4% in 2002 10.6% in 2011. Moreover, the average cash ratio and the median
cash ratio almost double throughout the sample period. This cash accumulation is of similar
magnitude of the one observed for the U.S. in the two decades ending in 2006 by Bates,
Kahle and Stulz (2009). The increase in cash ratios, no matter whether aggregate, average
or mean, does not happen through few drastic upward movements but grows steadily over
the sample period. We gauge that build up using regressions of cash ratios on a constant
and time and get positive and statistically significant estimates.
We take a step further and investigate whether this increase in cash is related to the
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firm’s characteristics or the environment in which the firms operate. Splitting firms by size,
we find that the average cash ratio increase is widespread and firms in all size brackets make
their balance sheets more liquid. In multivariate regression settings, our results point to the
prevalence of a precautionary motive for holding cash; Variables such as size, market-to-book
ratio and cash flow volatility are associated with holding larger cash ratios. Since our sample
is comprised of large firms, the results suggest that even the large Brazilian firms may find
it hard to access external funds.
Inasmuch as the literature, both theoretical and empirical, suggests that firms balance
cash and lines of credit, in the second set of results we detail the management of liquidity
through credit lines. Contrary to the finding in Sufi (2009), where the use of a credit line is
contingent on the firm generating enough cash flows, we find no evidence that such a relation
is present for the lines of credit in Brazil. Sufi (2009) associates those restrictions to the
existence of cash-flow-based covenants. In Brazil, however, lines of credit are granted against
collateral–no (explicit) fee structure is actually in place–and that, perhaps, makes them less
sensitive to the firm’s cash flows.
Another surprising result, given that lines of credit in Brazil are, in principle, less contin-
gent, is that we find conflicting evidence that credit lines could make up for cash. Not only
because of the magnitudes of the unused amounts on the domestic lines but also the signs of
the coefficients in regressions. After controlling for the overall demand for liquidity, we would
expect credit lines to be preferred in situations where cash is needed. However, our analysis
shows that the relative importance of credit lines in the liquidity available decreases in those
cases. In particular, size and market-to-book, while associated with cash accumulation are
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negatively associated with the use of credit lines.
In addition to these results we document some interesting stylized facts about cash poli-
cies in Brazil. Although considering only large firms, we observe that the largest firms in
the sample are the ones with the largest average cash ratios. Moreover, these are the firms
that become more liquid during the sample period. Hence, although credit conditions may
have improved, firms are storing more liquidity in the form of cash.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 describes the literature on cash and the recent
papers on the interplay between cash and credit lines. Section 3 outlines the steps we took
to build the datasets used in the study. Sections 4 and 5 proceed with the analyses of cash
policies and the use of lines of credit, respectively. Section 6 does some robustness tests and
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2.2 Related Literature and the Market for Credit Lines
In this section, we briefly review the literature on cash and lines of credit. It establishes
the theoretical and empirical grounds for why firms may hold cash and why they may be
prevented from relying on credit lines. While relating the results from empirical papers
to the theoretical hypothesis, we also discuss how some characteristics of the credit lines
and the environment in which firms operate in Brazil could affect the attractiveness of each
liquidity-management instrument.
In general, firms have four broad incentives for holding cash. The transaction motive,
advanced in Baumol (1952) and Miller and Orr (1966), addresses the costs of transforming
illiquid assets into cash to make payments. Since there are economies of scale, large firms
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hold less cash. However, both the recent technology developments and the availability of
hedging instruments may have reduced the transaction costs (also for small firms) and the
need for transaction-based cash holdings. Moreover, in particular for the firms operating in
Brazil, the historically high levels of inflation have led to the development of a sophisticated
payment system infrastructure. Also, high-yield government bonds make it less costly for
firms to carry liquid assets in their balance sheets.
Another argument is that firms retain cash for tax reasons. The tax motive suggests that
firms that have to pay additional taxes when repatriating foreign earnings accumulate more
cash. Foley et al. (2007) show evidence that this is one of the reasons for the recent built up in
cash holdings by multinational firms in the U.S. Bates et al. (2009) and Pinkowitz, Stulz, and
Williamson (2013), on the other hand, are skeptical about that result. The first shows that
cash ratios increased for firms that did not generate income abroad, while the second explores
the Homeland Investment Act of 2004, that reduced tax rates on foreign income for a short
period of time, and notice that cash holdings did not decrease even after large repatriations.
In Brazil, the current legislation establishes a complimentary taxation on foreign earnings
so that the total tax–in the foreign jurisdiction plus the domestic complement–adds up to
the domestic levels. For instance, had profits been taxed abroad at, say 20% and, in Brazil,
domestic operations were taxed at 30%, the firm is charged an extra 10%. Moreover, the
taxed amounts are due regardless of the actual repatriation of the funds. Hence, firms pay
the difference in tax levels as soon as they recognize the profits in their books. In other
words, according to the Brazilian legislation, it does not matter the jurisdiction where earn-
ings are realized; They are going to be taxed as if they were generated domestically, in the
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period they are recorded on the balance sheet. It is unlikely, then, that the tax motive has
an impact on Brazilian firms’ decision of accumulating cash.
Next, Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow problem is the basis for the agency motive for holding
cash. Excess liquidity could lead entrenched managers to choose not to payout dividends
and retain cash when no profitable projects are scheduled. In fact, these agency prob-
lems were associated with increased cash holdings in cross-country comparisons (Dittmar,
Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003)), and in situations where insider and outsider shareholders
disagree (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Pinkowitz et al. (2013)). It can also affect the
extensive margin, that is, the choice among the liquidity instruments. Yun (2009) shows
that firms under bad corporate governance mechanisms, therefore likely to misuse the excess
liquidity, resort more often to lines of credit in their liquidity management strategies 2.
The fourth reason for holding liquidity is the precautionary motive. That is because
managers think there are situations when they will not be able to get external financing for
investment or operations. Hence, firms with risky cash flows, few assets to offer, or lots of
investment opportunities, should maintain higher levels of liquidity. Indeed, these are the
empirical findings in Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999); U.S. firms that show
riskier cash flows or more growth opportunities hold more cash, while the ones with easier
access to external funds hold less cash-to-asset ratios. Several other papers reach similar
conclusions using very different approaches. For instance, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach
2Other agency problems have also been related with the choice between cash and credit lines. Acharya,
Almeida, Ippolito and Perez-Orive (2013) presents theory and evidence on the preference for cash among
firms that show high liquidity risk and, consequently, face higher probability of having their lines revoked.
This revocation mechanism would prevent firms insured with credit lines to maintain overall liquidity at
levels lower than needed to support shocks.
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(2004) provides theory and evidence that constrained firms save cash out of the cash flows
they receive, while unconstrained firms do not. Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) explains the
secular increase in cash holdings over the last decades with the increase in idiosyncratic risk
that results from the changing composition of the firms over the sample period.
The cost of external funds is certainly an issue in Brazil. Hence, hoarding liquidity should
be a big deal for the Brazilian firms. Debt markets are thin, so cannot be regarded as a
permanent source of financing. On a related venue, it was only recently, after sound reforms,
that the market for bank loans flourished–still, government owned banks grant a large share
of the credit under special terms. Therefore, it is surely interesting to study how firms in
Brazil managed liquidity in an evolving market where financial frictions are still tight.
The presence of the financial friction that underlie the precautionary motive asks for
liquidity cushions of any form–not only cash. Actually, the theories motivating the existence
of lines of credit (Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1987), Holmstrom and Tirole 1998) argue that
they were designed to be more cost effective instruments addressing exactly those frictions.
Indeed, recent surveys conducted by Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) and Campello, Gi-
ambona, Graham and Harvey (2011) confirm that managers do rely on credit lines to manage
liquidity.
However, only recently more comprehensive data on credit lines became available and the
extent to which lines of credit are instrumental in liquidity management could be tested. Sufi
(2009) was the first to present such results. It documents that cash and credit lines are of sim-
ilar magnitude, but, surprisingly, the latter are not full commitments as proposed by the theo-
ries. Both the access and use of credit lines are conditional on firms maintaining high levels of
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cash flows footnote The presence of cash-flow based covenants in the contracts in what makes
the credit lines contingent.. Almeida, Ippolito and Perez-Orive (2013) took another step and
proposed that banks include conditioning clauses in the contracts to counteract agency prob-
lems related to the liquidity insurance provided by the credit lines. The restricted access
to lines of credit was also justified by the aggregate nature of the risks faced by the firm in
Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2013). In this case, the pricing of the credit lines accounts
for the costs of providing liquidity for a large group of firms at the same time. Overall, the
studies suggest that lines of credit are not perfect substitutes for cash in managing liquidity.
The scarceness of data on lines of credit is pervasive3. Luckly, in Brazil banks record and
inform to the central bank the undrawn amount of the lines of credit outstanding. Since
this is the first study that uses data outside the developed world, we take a moment here
to describe some aspects of the market for credit lines in Brazil and the main characteris-
tics that could drive their performance as a liquidity instrument. First, banks are the only
providers of lines of credit in Brazil4. Hence, looking at cash holdings and bank information
should give a reasonable picture of the liquidity available for the firms. Second, as usual,
lines of credit represent access to pre-committed funds. However, their use is restricted to
financing a few types of credits: working capital, credit cards and guaranteed account. No-
tice that the funds can be drawn for any purpose, but in practice, they are not used for large
investments or (very) long-term projects. Third, perhaps due to this short-horizon feature,
3Jimenez and Saurina (2009) is the only study up to date that uses data other than for U.S firms.
It explores data on Spanish firms to find that default significantly discriminates firms’ behavior regarding
drawdowns. In particular, troubled firms not only drawdown more on their credit lines as compared to
healthy firms but also they intensify drawdowns when default approaches.
4Kashyap et al. (2002) and Gatev and Strahan (2006) argue that banks are the most efficient providers
of liquidity.
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no syndication among banks is observed in the market for credit lines. Fourth, and probably
the most distinguishing characteristic of the lines of credit in Brazil, there is no fee structure.
Apart from the predetermined interest rate on the drawn amount, no commitment fee on
the unused portion is due. Instead, firms are required to post collateral in order to get a line
open. This could have an impact on the attractiveness of credit lines as substitute for cash,
since it requires collateral that could backup other types of loans.
2.3 Data Assembling
We construct our samples by merging three datasets5. The first one is Economatica and
it contains data from Brazilian firms financial statements. It is basically comprised of
consolidated balance sheet data for corporations listed in the Brazilian Stock Exchange
(BMF&Bovespa). We start with all firms that appear in the list from 2002 to 2011. Our
sample is chosen in a way that it spans a period when the overall economy has stabilized
after the structural reforms of the mid-1990’s, but still undergoes deep changes in credit
markets in the 2000’s. It also covers the financial crisis of 2008-2009 so we can gauge its
effects on firms’ liquidity management policies, if any.
Since Economatica contains information on all listed firms, there are cases where both the
parent company and some of its subsidiaries have their stocks traded (hence, both appear
in the sample.) In these cases, to avoid double counting, especially cash, we exclude the
subsidiaries that are already consolidated6. We also eliminate financial firms and utilities
5A fourth dataset (from Compustat) is used to perform additional checks in the robustness section.
6We describe later in the section the challenges we face while identifying each economic conglomerate’s
subsidiaries
47
since we are interested in learning about liquidity management, and firms in those industries
may hold liquidity for regulatory purposes. Finally, we restrict the sample to firm-quarters
with positive book assets and non-negative cash observations, and leverage ratios in the
interval [0,1]. This procedure yields a sample of 241 firms with valid observations (2,457
firm-quarters). This is the data we use to describe Brazilian firms cash policies and we call
it the Cash Sample.
When we move on to study broader liquidity management policies, we add to Brazilian
firms’ balance sheet data, their credit outstanding from banks to form the LC sample. Banks
are the providers of lines of credit in Brazil which, together with other bank loan transac-
tion, are reported to the Brazilian Credit Bureau (SCR). Managed by the Brazilian Central
Bank, the SCR gathers information on a monthly basis about all banking loan transactions in
Brazil. More specifically, the SCR comprehends several characteristics of the loans granted
that are registered either individually or grouped together with others, depending on the
financial indebtedness of the borrower asking for the loan; Until 2011, all borrowers with
loans that (added up together) amount to R$5,000 (approximately, US$ 2,500) have their
loans reported on an individual basis. This means that every single loan–no matter what
value–granted by banks to such borrowers is fully characterized in the SCR. Starting in 2012,
the limit for this characterization of the contracts reduced to R$1,000, resulting in virtually
all loans being particularized in the SCR.7 Each individual record provides demographical
and financial information on both the borrower and the loan, such as: whether the borrower
is an individual or a corporation, the borrower’s location and economic sector (for firms),
7All other borrower’s loans are massed together into a cluster so that all credit granted by banks is
informed to and available at the credit register.
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internal rating provided by the bank, relationship status. At the loan level, the SCR speci-
fies, among other characteristics, the loan amount, the purpose for which it was granted, the
collateral associated with the operation, and the performance until it is repaid–or charged
off. We describe the fields we use in this study in more detail in the Appendix B.
One difficulty, however, prevents us from merging the financial statement’s data from
Economatica with the bank loans database from the SCR directly: the different level of con-
solidation of firms’ information. Inasmuch as the SCR was conceived to evaluate the credit
risk imposed on banks by credit operations, loans are recorded at the subsidiaries level, while
the balance sheet data from Economatica is published by the parent company and consol-
idates all subsidiaries. Unfortunately, until very recently there was no reliable/accessible
source of firms’ ownership structure available. This is the main reason why we lack stud-
ies relating Brazilian firms’ characteristics and bank financing-an important funding source,
especially where capital markets are underdeveloped.
We managed to overcome this limitation, identify the connections between the parent
company and its subsidiaries, and, for the first time, establish a thorough link between the
two datasets. In 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil (CVM) established
a (more) standardized data reporting system for publicly held companies–that’s the third
dataset; Firms should file a Reference Forms (RF) yearly containing information about se-
lected financial ratios and policies, the risk factors affecting revenues and operations, board
members comments. In sum, RFs add detailed and analytical prospects of the firm’s own
view of the environment in which it operates, and the business challenges and opportunities
it faces. In particular, Section 8 (RFS8) of the Reference Form presents the organizational
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structure of the economic group. It lists all subsidiaries that belong to the economic group
and the relationship with the parent company.
Unfortunately, even though the ownership structure is presented in Section 8, virtually
no company choose to identify its subsidiaries with the CNPJ code8. We need the CNPJ
to merge the subsidiaries listed in Section 8 (for each economic group) with the ones that
appear in the SCR–to get the amount of credit granted or available through lines of credit.
In order to each complete this task, we use the name of controlled subsidiary we get from
RFS8 to go online and hand collect the CNPJ codes. We perform this search for firms whose
economic group meet one of the two criteria: 1) compounds the IBRX index of the Brazilian
Exchange or 2) appears in the list of the latest 200 Largest corporations in Brazil, published
at the magazine Valor Grandes Grupos. In the end, out of the 355 firms in the Cash Sample,
122 firms meet those criteria, for which we catalogued over three thousand CNPJs online.
These are the subsidiaries we start out with to form our LC Sample9.
Although the SCR started collecting data in 2002, we keep the firms for which we found
CNPJs online and that have credit line contracts outstanding, starting in March 2007 when
more comprehensive data becomes available10. We restrict the sample to loans originated at
the bank that carries the operation, using nonearmarked resources. We choose this subset
for two reasons: First, by restricting the sample to loans granted by the bank, one guarantees
8Describe the CNPJ
9One caveat with merging CNPJs from the subsidiaries listed results from the fact that the Reference
Forms were adopted in 2010. For the information in Section 8 goes back at most two year, we can construct
economic groups from 2008 on. Hence, we use the ownership structure of 2008 to form groups at earlier
dates. In order to evaluate the effect of this procedure in our descriptive statistics and regression results, we
perform checks in the robustness section restricting the sample to start in 2008.
10We use the entire SCR database using these filters for dates and loan characteristics to make general
comments about the loans market in Brazil.
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the use of the same credit evaluation methodology–while acquired operations could differ in
this dimension. Second, by keeping only transactions made with nonearmarked resources one
assures that market conditions will drive both incentives to lend and contract terms, such as
interest rate and maturity. For this subset of firms, we gather all loans outstanding in each
date, by bank and purpose. For example, for a firm contracting an credit line in March 2008
with bank A, we extract all other loans outstanding at all banks for different purposes (work-
ing capital at banks A and B, project finance at bank C, etc.) The sample runs until Decem-
ber 2011, and after the matches through CNPJ codes and filters, the LC Sample consists of
93 of the largest economic groups (1,875 firm-quarter observations) of the Brazilian economy.
Given restrictions in the way data is informed in the SCR, it is not possible to isolate the
unused lines of credit from other loans that are already contracted but not granted in full.
These pre-contracted loans either have disbursement schedules or release money conditional
on the execution of the phases of a project. However, although the level of the unused credit
lines could be contaminated, there is no reason to think that the firms could unilaterally
alter the dynamics of the disbursements.
2.4 Brazilian Firms’ Cash Policy
2.4.1 Cash Variables Definition and Samples Statistics
Using the samples constructed in the previous section, we depict the state of corporate liq-
uidity policies implemented in Brazilian large firms. In particular, we use the Cash Sample to
describe cash policies and the LC Sample to talk more broadly about liquidity management.
Before we delve into specific aspects of the liquidity management policies of Brazilian firms,
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we define variables of interest and give a general description of the firms in our samples.
Table 6 shows summary statistics for some of the variables we use in our study. We start
noticing the dispersion on firms’ total assets with the median firm showing around 1 trillion
Brazilian Reais in assets in the Cash Sample, while the average firm is seven times larger.
Similar pattern is observed for the LC Sample, except that firms are even larger. That is, in
both samples the very large firms dominate the spectrum, being the LC Sample more biased
towards those firms.
Cash is built as the difference between Gross debt and Net debt. We use this approach
because there were a lot of missing values for the variable Cash and Equivalents in Econo-
matica. Besides, Economatica does not treat the balance sheet information to classify more
uniformly the instruments firms in different industries report as cash. Additionally, this is the
definition market analysts use in their evaluations of firms prospects. We can, then, define the
Cash Ratio as Cash divided by total assets; The Cash Sample in Table 6 shows 7.8% (5.2%)
for the average (median) firm’s Cash Ratio, while firms in the LC Sample hold fifty percent
more cash on average11. Therefore, since firms are larger in the LC Sample, this is the first
evidence that among listed firms in Brazil, the larger ones hold more liquid balance sheets.
Despite the differences in firms’ size, Table 6 shows that Cash flows, defined as EBITDA
divided by total assets, are of the same magnitude for firms in both samples. The same
is true for the median Book Leverage, defined as Gross Debt over total assets, where debt
represents around a quarter of the firms’ assets. The smaller firms, which appear in the Cash
Sample, seem to be more levered, holding the equivalent of 42% of their assets in the form
11As a way of comparison, the average large Brazilian firm holds roughly half of the cash an average
Compustat firm holds as a proportion of book assets–same for the median.
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of debt. Also, investment opportunities as measured by the market value of assets divided
by assets (or Net assets) show balance between the two samples, with market values being
up by 20%-50%. Finally, the industries represented in both samples face similar level of
uncertainties, as their cash flow volatilities express12.
2.4.2 The Increase in Cash Holdings
We now concentrate on the Cash Sample, where data runs from 2002 to 2011. Table 7 show
the evolution of cash levels and cash ratios throughout the period. The second column of
Table 7 shows aggregate cash level, where we add cash holdings of all firms in each quarter.
Aggregate cash increases steadily in real terms, reaching the peak by the third quarter of
2011, at almost four times the level observed in the beginning of the sample. We also compute
the behavior of cash ratios, in other words, how liquid firm’s balance sheets have become. For
each quarter we calculate aggregate, average and median ratios. The third column of Table
7 summarizes the aggregate cash ratios, which is the sum of Cash for all firms divided by the
sum of all assets. The aggregate cash ratio is 6.4% in 2002 and increases to 10.6% in 2011.
Columns four and five also report significant increases in average and median cash ratios. The
average and media cash ratios are in 2011, respectively, 170% and 283% larger that in 2002.
To test whether this increase in cash ratios is present throughout the sample period–and
is not concentrated in a few periods–we follow Bates et al. (2009) and estimate regressions
of the cash ratios on a constant and time (trend). The estimated coefficient for the trend in
the aggregate cash ratio regression indicates a yearly increase of 0.4%. For the median cash
12In order to get estimates of each industry cash flow volatility, we first calculate cash flow volatilities for
the firms using the previous five years of data. We require that at least five data points are used (one per
year). Then, at each quarter, we average cash flow volatilities for firms in the same industry (2-digit SIC.)
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ratio, the trend coefficient suggests an even steeper increase, around 0.6% per year. These
results are consistent with the presence of a time trend in cash ratios throughout the period
considered in this study.
2.4.3 Cash and Firm’ Characteristics
The evidence in the previous section characterizes a secular increase in cash holdings by
Brazilian firms. In this section we take a step to investigate whether this increase in cash is
related to firm characteristics or the environment in which the firm operates. We start with
a one-dimensional analysis, size, and then add other important dimension in a multiple re-
gression setup. For instance, large firms could benefit both from scale effects and from better
access to external funds, lowering transaction costs and the effects of the precautionary mo-
tive for holding cash, respectively. These analyses are an attempt to address how pervasive
was the increase in cash we documented above and understand the forces associated with
this cash saving behavior.
Figure 1 shows the average cash ratios for firms split by size quartiles. To build each
size quartile we divide firms in the sample into size quartiles each quarter, according to
their assets value at the beginning of the quarter13. First, one noticeable feature of the
cash policies is that firms in the lowest size quartile hold less cash as a proportion of assets
than the ones in the highest quartile. That is in contrast with what we expect from the
textbook transaction motive14. Moreover, the tax and the agency motives are expected to
play secondary roles in the decision of how much cash firms hold.
13Results remain when we use the market value of assets to break the sample into quartiles
14In Brazil, government bonds are attractive liquid instruments since yields are usually very high compared
to international standards. This reduces the relevance of the transaction motive.
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Second, the average cash ratio increases for firms in all size brackets. The increase is
more prominent in the first two-thirds of the sample, while the period after the financial
crisis of 2008 shows lower cash ratio growth rates. It results in both, the smallest and largest
firms in the sample, more than doubling their average cash holdings from 2002 to 2011, even
considering the turbulent years of the financial crisis. Firms in the intermediary size brackets
grow cash ratios at a lower pace.
In sum, not only the largest firms in the sample hold more cash than the smallest ones but
also they save increasingly higher proportion of their assets in the form of cash. Since firm
size is usually (inversely) correlated with the likelihood of binding financial constraints, we
would expect the precautionary motive to lead smaller firms to hold more cash and increase
cash ratios more15. Unexpectedly, it is for the largest firms that the level and trend in cash
ratios grow faster. Hence, if firms are saving cash for precautionary reasons, it suggests a
widespread difficulty in accessing liquidity when most needed.
Next, we study how size, together with other firm’s attributes explain the increase in
cash holdings. We relate these variables in a multivariate panel regression to estimate the
effect that changes in firm’s characteristics have on cash holdings. Even though the cash-to-
assets ratio is the most common measure, we build one alternative measure of cash holdings
normalized by total assets except cash (Cash / Net assets); Some papers have adopted such
alternative in order to better gauge the relation between liquid and illiquid assets and we
also report the results for these specifications.
15Unreported results show that, when we split the sample firms according to the historic volatility levels
of the industries in which they operate, firms in all industry volatility brackets present similar cash ratios.
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Regarding the explanatory variables, we follow Opler et al. (1999) and build variables re-
lated with the transaction and precautionary motives for saving cash 16. In our specifications
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. We expect positive coefficient estimates since it
should capture the economies of scale of holding cash as well as the firm’s profitability. In-
dustry Cash Flow Volatility is the average standard deviation of the firms within an industry.
It gauges the capacity firms have to repay debts and reflects the terms they face when raising
external funds. Hence, its coefficients should also have a positive sign. Market-to-Book ratio
is the market value of assets divided by total assets and it proxies for the firm’s investment
opportunities. Here we await positive coefficients because it is more costly for firms with
better investment opportunities to be financially constrained, so they tend to value cash for
precautionary reasons. We measure Cash Flow as EBITDA divided by assets. As cash flows
relate to the ability firms have to accumulate cash, we look forward to positive coefficients.
Leverage is Gross debt over assets, and it could reflect either the necessity of using cash (to
make repayments) or an extra room for more savings. Likewise, Investment, measured as
Capex over assets, could either signal the need for higher cash ratios, if they capture growth
opportunities or serve as collateral, or lower ratios, when cash has already been invested.
Therefore, either positive or negative coefficient estimate would be in line with the stories
we have in mind for how changes in Investments or Leverage could affect cash ratios.
All variables in the study are deflated using the Broad National Consumer Price Index
(IPCA) calculated by the IBGE–The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics17. We
16Comments about the variables we do not use in our specification.
17The historical for the inflation index can be found at the Brazilian Central Bank website:
https://www3.bcb.gov.br/sgspub/consultarvalores/consultarValoresSeries.do?method=consultarValores.
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use 2013 Q3 as the reference quarter. Also, the variables are winsorized at the 1% percent
level at both ends of their distributions, except Leverage, for which we have stronger require-
ments. Leverage should remain in the interval between zero and one for all firm-quarters in
the sample.
We report our regression results in Table 8. In all runs, standard errors are clustered
at the industry level, allowing for correlation structures both among firms in the same in-
dustry and through time. After all the cleaning process and filters, we are left with 2457
firm-quarters, for 241 firms that appear in the sample from 2002 to 2011. Model 1 con-
sists of a pooled OLS regression–so no fixed effects of dummies are present. Both size and
Market-to-Book ratio show significant and positive coefficients. These are the variables that
remain significant and show similar magnitude as we move through the other specifications
and introduce further restrictions. In model 2 we re-estimate model 1 with the log of cash
over net assets as the dependent variable. On top of the effects by size and Market-to-Book
ratio, increases in the cash flows received by the firms are associated with increases in the
cash holdings. However, it is hard to tell which of these specifications better explain the
relationship between cash holdings and the other firm’s characteristics.
Next, we consider regressions that control for unobserved time-invariant effects. Our first
attempt was to rerun model 1 in differences. In reported regression, we get similar statistical
significance of the coefficients, but magnitudes are harder to interpret with all variables ap-
pearing differenced. Second, in model 4 and 5, we add cumulatively industry and year fixed
effects to our first specification. Again, the effects of size and Market-to-Book ratio remain
strongly significant and, with these fixed effects, industry cash flow volatility also plays a
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role in explaining the variation in cash holdings. Beyond their statistical significance, their
economic magnitude is not trivial. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in firms’
investment opportunities, gauged by the Market-to-Book ratio, is associated with one-fourth
standard deviation in cash ratios. Also, firms that are two standard deviations larger (size),
other characteristics constant, hold one-third standard deviation more cash. The fact that
these estimates survive the introduction of industry and year fixed effects shows that the
effects comes from firms within an industry growing in size and facing better investment
opportunities throughout the sample period, respectively–not from an intrinsic difference
along those dimensions.
In model 5, our final specification for the cash regressions, we introduce firm fixed ef-
fects. In this specification other characteristics like cash flow and leverage gain importance
in explaining cash holdings. Capex also appears as a significant variable, although with a
negative sign (as opposed the previous specifications). However, it could be just that the
within firm variation in this specification lacks power to capture the effects on cash holdings.
Finally, we augment all the specifications above with either a before-after crisis dummy or
a crisis dummy. The before-after dummy is set to zero from 2002q1 to 2007q4 and to one
in all quarters from 2009 to 2011, while the crisis dummy is set to one in the years of 2008
and 2009. In unreported regressions, the introduction of such variables not only does not
change the statistical significance or the magnitude of the coefficients but also show that the
intercepts do not change throughout the crisis.
Overall, our results point to the prevalence of a precautionary motive for holding cash.
For instance, our regression results reinforce the idea that even large firms may find it hard
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to access external funds. Moreover, the other variables we use to proxy for those risks aim in
the same direction. Nevertheless, we wait until the characterization of the market for lines of
credit in the next section to make more assertive statements about broader firms’ liquidity
management policies.
2.5 Broader Liquidity Management: Lines of Credit
In this section we complement our analysis of the Brazilian firms’ liquidity management
policies taking a look at the characteristics of the market for lines of credit (LC). Credit lines,
as we described in section 2, are the closest substitute for cash and, hence, deserve special
attention as a tool for managing liquidity. In Brazil, individual banks are the only providers
of credit lines. That is why we use the Brazilian Credit Bureau to build the LC Sample.
2.5.1 Lines of Credit and Loans
Our LC Sample comprehends the loans granted and the unused amount of credit lines for all
firms satisfying the criteria outlined in section 3. Figure 2 shows the recent developments in
credit markets and the usage of lines of credit for the 93 firms selected into the LC sample.
The graphs in Figure 2 use data on the unused lines, the total loans outstanding, and the
loans granted with nonearmarked resources, from 2007 to 2011. The graphs offer a brief
overview of the recent dynamics of theses markets.
The graph on the top in Figure 2 presents the variables in levels. Both unused credit lines
and total loans for the selected companies grow throughout the sample period; total loans
expanded around 90% and the amount of resources available through lines increased 80%.
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The behavior is consistent with the recent spur in credit markets in Brazil, following a series
of institutional reforms. As a consequence, total loans are mainly driven by nonearmarked
credit until its peak right after the arrival of the financial crisis in Brazil. After that, the total
loans dynamics is dominated by the increase in earmarked resources, explained by the fast
response from the public owned banks. Also, during this second half of the sample unused
credit lines accumulate at a stronger growth rate to reach the highest levels in our sample.
On the lower graph of Figure 2 we scale the unused lines by nonearmarked loans and the
nonearmarked loans by total loans, respectively, so we better reveal the dynamics of the use
of the lines of credit and the (government) subsidized loans. Both the bars for the credit lines
and the line for nonearmarked loans highlight the effects observed on the top graph. For
one, the government response to the crisis through the increase of the availability of credit
crowd out the loans granted under market standards. On the credit lines side, the unused
amounts dropped upon the arrival of the crisis. Although there is a denominator effect due
to the increase in loans (in the first half of the sample), it indicates that drawdowns on the
credit lines by the firms may have increased, perhaps for liquidity purposes. 18
2.5.2 The Characterization of Credit Lines
We continue on with the description of the lines of credit in Table 9. Here we present more
detailed characteristics of both the banks granting lines and the lines themselves. First,
we split the sample in unused lines of credit quartiles; For each firm-quarter, we calculate
18In Appendix C we show a similar graph for all firms with credit lines outstanding in the Brazilian
Credit Bureau. The pattern there confirms the more intensive use of the unused lines of credit balances
during the crisis. The perception is reinforced by the fact that the denominator effect is not as strong as
for the firms in the LC sample.
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the amount of unused LC and sort each observation into one of the four brackets. Each
figure is then calculated as an average for the firms in each quartile. Panel A describes bank
characteristics for all information in the SCR (after applying the filters we depicted earlier).
As expected, firms that contracted largest credit line buffers do business with the largest
banks. Still, the fraction of loans and deposits do not vary regardless of the LC quartile.
Interestingly, though, banks’ capital positions decreases monotonically, with those carrying
the largest amount of unused credit lines showing weaker capital positions. While banks in
all outstanding LC brackets conform with the minimum capital standards19, the low quartile
shows capital ratio almost three times larger than the one in the high quartile.
In Panel B, we better details the lines of credit to assess their importance in liquidity
management. Considering all firms (in the SCR), the unused portion of the line represents
13-14% of the loans granted. Half of these outstanding lines of credit have maturities of at
most one year, expect for the largest ones. In this latter case, the short-term agreements
account for 70% of the unused lines of credit, reflecting the larger risk of these operations.
When we consider the LC Sample, we see different patterns for both the fraction of the
unused amounts and maturities. Indeed, the firms in the lowest quartile hold twice as much
unused lines of credit as the firms in the highest quartile. This suggests that these firms
not only hold less liquidity in the form of credit lines but also are less indebted. Moreover,
among these firms with low unused amounts there is a prevalence of short-term credit lines
(80%), while for the firms with large unused buffers only 40% of the funds available through
19Brazil adopts the recommendations of the Basel Committee with regards to capital adequacy ratios.
The minimum regulatory capital ratio is 11% for all banks operating in Brazil, while the Agreement, known
as Basel II, requires 8% for internationally active banks.
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credit lines are short-term. This picture suggests that even some of the large firms in the LC
sample could be financially constrained and face restriction when accessing external funds.
Finally, we build two important measures of liquidity, which we will use in the remainder
of our analysis of credit lines: the unused portion as a fraction of total assets and the LC
liquidity ratio. The first measure allows us to directly compare the importance of credit lines
relative to cash in the firm’s balance sheet. We observe that large firms in Brazil hold between
0 and 4% of their assets in the form of unused lines. We can compare those figures with the
11% median cash ratio for firms in the LC Sample. Following Sufi (2009), the second measure
is the amount of unused credit lines divided by the sum of the unused portion and cash. Im-
portantly, this measure helps mitigate the concern that omitted bias caused by larger liquidity
needs could drive the regression results. It captures the amount of liquidity available to firms
through lines of credit, while controlling for the total liquidity available. According to the
last line in Table 9, the firms with the larger unused amounts of credit lines hold 24% of their
liquidity in that form, while the LC liquidity is lower for firms in the other quartiles of the un-
used credit lines. Sufi (2009) documents LC liquidity ratios around 50% for firms randomly
selected from Compustat. Although not in the same levels observed in the US, the ratios ob-
served for Brazilian firms suggest that credit lines could be of assistance in managing liquidity.
2.5.3 Do credit lines make up for cash?
The literature, both theoretical and empirical, presents a tension between the choice of cash
and lines of credit. Although the seminal papers suggested the use of credit lines to overcome
the financial constraints in a similar way holding cash would do, the more recent papers
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advocate that lines of credit are not unconditional commitments. Moreover, they support
that banks also wouldn’t have enough funds (or monitoring would be too costly) if many firms
were to draw at the same time, so credit lines wouldn’t be such a perfect substitute for cash.
In this section we test whether this is the case for the Brazilian firms and what are the
firm’s behavior that prevents (or incentivize) them to lean on lines of credit. In other words,
we examine the effect of firm’s characteristics on the LC liquidity ratio using different regres-
sion specifications. The dependent variable is the LC liquidity ratio. In some specifications
we split the unused lines of credit in short-term and long-term to understand whether the
impacts are on the day-to-day liquidity management or on more structural restrictions in
accessing these funds. When choosing the regressors, we trust on the theory put forward in
section 2, which discusses what forces drive firms to use internal funds (cash)–instead of rely-
ing on credit lines. Five variables address these dimensions: size, cash flows, Market-to-Book
ratio, industry cash flow volatility, and Capex. These variables were defined in the previous
section, except that here they are scaled by Net Assets (Assets minus Cash). We exclude
cash from Net Assets because the firms most likely decide jointly how much liquidity to hold
in the form of cash or credit lines. This decision would, therefore, result in a mechanical
relationship between the regressors and the dependent variable. For instance, as explained
in Sufi (2009), “For the same nominal cash flow, firms without a line of credit will hold more
cash than those with a line of credit, which will mechanically lead to a lower level of cash flow
scaled by total assets for the firms that do not have a line of credit.” Additionally, we augment
the set of regressors with the fraction of loans rated best (AA-C, in a scale that goes up to H),
leverage and relationship time length (in years) to improve our power of addressing the risks
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faced by the banks when granting a line of credit. We also include dummy variables to mea-
sure whether the financial crisis affected the way firms’ characteristics interact with liquidity
management policies. The crisis dummy is set to one for quarters in the years of 2008 to 2010
and to zero for all other periods. Finally, all regressors but the crisis dummy enter lagged in
the regressions and in all specifications the standard errors are clustered at the industry level.
Since all firms in the LC sample have credit lines outstanding, we evaluate the effects
of the firm’s characteristics on the intensive margin20. Column 1 of Table 10 reports the
coefficients for the pooled OLS regression. Consistent with the view that firms with better
investment opportunities prefer cash, we observe a negative correlation between Market-to-
Book ratio and the amount of liquidity in credit lines. The size coefficient, although not
economically significant, predicts that larger firms also prefer cash as a liquidity manage-
ment tool. Firms in industries were cash flows are more volatile store higher proportion of
their liquidity in the form of lines of credit. The coefficient estimate indicates that a two-
standard deviation increase in industry cash flow volatility from the mean is associated with
a one-fifth standard deviation increase in the fraction of credit lines in total liquidity. These
estimates survive the introduction of the fixed effects as shown in columns 2 and 3, which
confirms that the results come from changes in the firms’ characteristics along the sample
period and not from the intrinsic difference among firms.
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 10, we present results separately for short-term and long-term
credit-line maturities. Short-term credit lines are due in at most one year. The dependent
20We are mute about why firms enter this market at the first place. Sufi (2009) uses the same set of
variables to explain both the intensive and the extensive margins and find similar signs and statistical
significance.
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variables are then the undrawn amount available in short-term and long-term credit lines,
respectively–scaled by the total liquidity. While the same characteristics drive the choice
between the different maturities, banks seem to more carefully evaluate firms when granting
longer-term credit lines. The coefficient on the fraction of loans rated AA-C is significant
for long-term credit lines (column 6), although the relationship length does not matter.
These results pose a question on whether firms consider that lines of credit offer the same
kind of insurance that cash provides. Sufi (2009) suggests complementarity by providing ev-
idence that the firm’s access and use of lines of credit are related to cash flows; Firms with
low cash flows are less prone to use credit lines and use cash instead. HCCW (2013) extend
this result showing that the relation between cash and lines of credit hold unconditionally.
However, we do not observe these relations for the Brazilian firms we analyze. First, the
regression estimates for cash flows in Table 10 show no statistical significance. Figure 3
translates that in a graph that maps the unused lines of credit and the average cash ratios
across the cash-flow distribution. While there is strong evidence of a positive relation be-
tween cash and cash flows, unused lines of credit remain flat regardless of cash flows received
by the firm. Moving from the low to the high end of the cash flow distribution, cash hold-
ings increase from 11% to 15% of total assets and unused lines of credit stay around 2%.
If anything, in the high end of the cash flow distribution, both cash and credit lines go up
together, making the complementarity even harder to obtain.
Moreover, when we look at unconditional distributions over time, we find conflicting evi-
dence with Almeida, Campello, Cunha and Weisbach (2013). They show that firms without
access to a line of credit hold two-to-three times more cash than firms with a credit line.
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Although all firms in the LC Sample have a line of credit outstanding, Table 11 uses firm-
quarters where the unused line of credit balance is zero to benchmark cash policies of firms
that have no completely exhausted their credit lines. In contrast to Almeida et al. (2013),
firms without credit lines to tap on hold less cash than the ones that still can draw on their
lines. In this case, it seems that firms beyond having depleted their lines of credit, they are
not able to build cash reserves as the other firms in the sample.
Overall, it seems that the market for domestic lines of credit in Brazil cannot provide the
level of (complementary) liquidity insurance for which firms seek. The combined results from
the cash and credit lines analyses indicate that even the largest firms in Brazil rely on cash
to manage liquidity, since only a thin layer is available through lines of credit. Moreover, the
relative importance of credit lines does not respond appropriately to changes in firm’s char-
acteristics as we expected. Perhaps, the market for lines of credit is structured in a way that
prevents firms from using such instruments to more effectively manage liquidity. For instance,
for credit lines are granted based on the availability of collateral, it could be that there is
competition for collateral and firms would “save” assets for other types of credit instruments.
2.6 Some Robustness
The construction of the datasets shows that data availability is an important issue in this
study. Even getting access to reliable balance sheet data information is troublesome, for we
have to go through several steps cleaning the data and combining variables before using it.
The process is, of course, not flawless. Therefore, we try to evaluate how good the whole
screening process performs by repeating some of the tests on a different database. In order
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to accomplish this task, we use a sample of Brazilian firms extracted from Compustat Global
and apply the same restrictions we imposed in the Cash sample. The Compustat Sample
comprises firms that appear in Compustat Global–Fundamentals Annual, from 1999 to 2012
and show positive book assets and non-negative cash observations, and leverage ratios in the
interval [0,1].
Using Compustat variables, we confirm the increase in cash ratios we have documented
in section 4. Despite the differences in the levels of the variables, Table 12 shows that the
increases in the different definitions of cash ratios are of similar magnitude. Although not
reported in the table, regressing the cash variable (aggregate, average or median) on a con-
stant and time also results in a significant positive coefficient estimate. Hence, the growth
in cash ratios occurs throughout the entire sample period. Moreover, also unreported if we
split the sample according to size brackets results in the same pattern: large firms hold more
cash. Finally, the use of yearly observations speaks to the issue of the variability in the data.
Regressions using annual data give the same qualitative results as observed for our Cash
sample specifications.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
We characterize the liquidity management policies of large Brazilian firms in the past decade.
In particular, we examine two of the most widely used instruments: cash and lines of credit.
For that, we managed to bring together large firm’s balance sheet data and the information
available at the Brazilian Credit Bureau, through the new filings’ requirements with the
Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil. We describe how those instruments are used
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for managing liquidity, how they interact with each other and how their features affect the
firm’s choice between them. To our knowledge, this is the first study to explore this broader
concept of liquidity in emerging market economies.
First, we document a secular increase in cash ratios. From 2002 to 2001, average cash
ratios more than doubles during the period, in a movement of similar magnitude of that
observed for U.S. firms. The increase is widespread among firms of all sizes. Interestingly,
the largest firms in the sample are the ones with the most liquid balance sheets, suggest-
ing that even for these firms external funds are not easily available. When accounting for
other dimensions that could affect the likelihood that firms need liquidity or raise external
financing in multivariate regression settings, we find evidence that firms that have restricted
resources to invest hold more cash.
As for lines of credit, we observe that there are differences in the way the market works.
There are no fees charged for using (or not using) the contracted credit line. When granting
a line, the banks require that the firms post collateral. On one side, this feature makes
credit lines less sensitive to the firms’ characteristics that explain why sometimes the firms
have to rely on cash. While Sufi (2009) documents that covenants based on cash flows could
prevent the firms from using credit lines as a source of liquidity, we find no relationship
between the cash flows received and its relative importance with respect to cash. However,
firms draw on their lines in the beginning the financial crisis, suggesting potential frictions
in contracting new loans. The magnitudes of the funds available through the unused portion
of the credit lines are small when compared to the cash holdings of firms operating in Brazil.
Another possibility is that these firms rely on credit lines obtained abroad to help manage
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their liquidity. Unfortunately, we do not have access to data on external credit lines external
to which these large firms could rely on.
Overall, it seems that the market for domestic lines of credit in Brazil cannot provide the
level of (complementary) liquidity insurance for which firms seek. The combined results of
the cash and credit lines analyses indicate that even the largest firms in Brazil rely on cash
to manage liquidity, since only a thin layer is available through lines of credit. Moreover,
the relative importance of credit lines does not respond appropriately to changes in firm’s
characteristics as we expected. Perhaps, the market for lines of credit is structured in a way
that prevents firms from using such instruments to more effectively manage liquidity. The
fact that credit lines are granted based on the availability of collateral makes competition
for collateral plausible and firms could “save” assets for other types of credit instruments.
Finally, besides documenting the preference for cash when managing liquidity, we high-
light importance of merging the data from the financial sector and the (listed) non-financial
sector of the Brazilian economy. It allows us for instance to explore further the wrinkles
on the contracts for credit lines and, perhaps, design policies to improve the use of lines of
credit as an effective liquidity management tool. Beyond liquidity issues, the link between
firms and subsidiaries permits us to gain better knowledge about the credit markets both
from the standpoint of the risks that banks face, and from the incentives firms may have in
deciding their capital structure.
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2.8 Figures
This graph shows the evolution of average cash ratios for firms in the Cash Sample, that comprises all listed firmsin Economatica from 2002-­‐2011 (and meet the criteria in Section 3). The cash ratio is measured as cash scaled bytotal assets. Firms are sorted into quartiles based on the total assets in the beginning of each year. The firstquartile	  (Q1)	  comprehends	  the	  smallest	  firms	  in	  the	  sample,	  while	  the	  fourth	  quartile	  (Q4)	  is	  composed	  of	  the	  
Figure	  1.	  Average	  cash	  ratios	  by	  size	  quartile	  from	  2002	  to	  2011
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Unused LC / Nonearmarked (left)
Figure	  2.	  Credit	  Growth	  and	  Lines	  of	  Credit	  UsageThis graph shows the evolution of total and nonearmarked loans, and unused lines of credit for firms in the LCSample. The LC sample restricts the set of firms in Economatica to those that: 1) are components of the IBRXindex or 2) appear in the list of the 200 largest/best firms in Brazil (Valor Economico magazine), and 3) havelines of credit outstanding in the SCR (see criteria in Section 3). Total credit refers to all loans outstanding.Nonearmarked	  credit	  reflcts	  the	  loans	  granted	  under	  market	  conditions.
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Figure	  3	  –	  Cash	  and	  Lines	  of	  Credit	  across	  the	  Cash	  Flows	  DistributionThis graph shows to cash-­‐to-­‐asset and the LC-­‐to-­‐assets ratios across the lagged cash flow distribuition, for firmsin the LC Sample. The LC sample restricts the set of firms in Economatica to those that: 1) are components of theIBRX index or 2) appear in the list of the 200 largest/best firms in Brazil (Valor Economico magazine), and 3)have lines of credit outstanding in the SCR (see criteria in Section 3). The first decile represents the observationswith	  the	  lowest	  levels	  of	  cash	  flows.
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2.9 Tables
Variable
Mean
MedianSt.	  Dev.
Mean
Median
St.	  Dev.
Firm	  characteristics
Total	  Assets	  (R$	  Billion)
7,562
1,172
29,500
17,202
4,377
45,603
Cash	  /	  Total	  Assets
0.078
0.052
0.083
0.123
0.110
0.084
Cash	  /	  Net	  Assets
0.096
0.055
0.119
0.152
0.124
0.123
Cash	  flows
0.086
0.062
0.090
0.092
0.070
0.082
Book	  Leverage
0.421
0.258
1.414
0.291
0.277
0.157
Market-­‐to-­‐Book
1.199
0.869
1.493
1.542
1.229
1.083
Market-­‐to-­‐Book	  (cash	  adjusted)
1.335
0.964
1.577
1.794
1.417
1.292
Industry	  cash	  flow	  volatility
0.049
0.047
0.027
0.057
0.052
0.027
Thistableprovidessummarystatisticsforselectedfirm'scharacteristics.Thefiguresarecalculatedbyaveragingeachvariableoverfirm-­‐
quarters.AllvariablesuseinformationfromEconomatica:TotalassetsarepresentedinBrazilianReais(US$1=R$2.5);Cashisdefined
asthedifferencebetweenGrossDebtandNetDebt;CashflowsarebuiltasEBITDAdividedbyTotalAssets;BookLeverageisthethe
amountofGrossDebtscaledbyTotalAssets;Market-­‐to-­‐BookisthemarketvalueofassetsdividedbyTotalAssets;NetAssetssubtract
theamountofCashfromTotalAssets,andthe"cashadjusted"variablesarescaledbyNetAssets;Industrycashflowvolatilityisthe
averagecashflowvolatilityoftheindustries(2-­‐digitSIC)-­‐beingindustrycashflowvolatilitythestandarddeviationoffirm'scashflows
withinanindustry-­‐quarter(detailsintheAppendix).Theinformationispresentedfortwosamples:theCashSample,thatcomprisesall
listedfirmsinEconomaticafrom2002-­‐2011(andmeetthecriteriainSection3),andtheLCSample,whichrestrictsthefirmsinthe
previous	  sample	  to	  those	  showing	  valid	  observations	  for	  lines	  of	  credit.
Cash	  Sample
LC	  Sample
Table	  6.	  Sum
m
ary	  Statistics	  for	  Firm
's	  Characteristics
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Year Firms Aggregate	  Cash Aggregate	  Cash	  Ratio Average	  Cash	  Ratio Median	  Cash	  RatioQ1	  2002 225 84,441,176	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.064 0.053 0.024Q2 231 84,369,776	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.061 0.056 0.023Q3 226 106,521,376	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.072 0.064 0.026Q4 298 124,080,672	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.063 0.060 0.026Q1	  2003 234 89,833,992	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.063 0.054 0.025Q2 233 92,924,248	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.066 0.055 0.022Q3 234 110,023,760	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.074 0.060 0.029Q4 297 141,866,256	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.073 0.064 0.035Q1	  2004 240 126,764,208	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.082 0.067 0.038Q2 238 125,973,440	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.082 0.068 0.038Q3 233 124,740,944	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.080 0.065 0.034Q4 295 144,070,976	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.075 0.065 0.034Q1	  2005 281 118,088,912	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.072 0.059 0.034Q2 284 116,845,352	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.071 0.060 0.032Q3 281 132,104,896	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.079 0.062 0.034Q4 325 159,257,936	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.080 0.066 0.039Q1	  2006 284 154,073,920	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.089 0.069 0.043Q2 281 149,267,312	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.084 0.069 0.041Q3 283 163,616,960	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.087 0.071 0.047Q4 327 199,596,688	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.086 0.077 0.052Q1	  2007 295 189,610,784	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.084 0.085 0.063Q2 298 172,845,456	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.077 0.081 0.058Q3 298 183,949,216	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.079 0.086 0.059Q4 329 194,539,056	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.078 0.082 0.059Q1	  2008 296 191,458,704	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.080 0.088 0.069Q2 296 189,655,808	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.078 0.082 0.064Q3 298 230,617,712	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.088 0.085 0.068Q4 320 268,670,432	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.094 0.080 0.054Q1	  2009 295 234,218,400	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.083 0.075 0.060Q2 291 210,886,176	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.077 0.080 0.057Q3 287 238,138,992	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.086 0.083 0.061Q4 314 271,593,952	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.093 0.088 0.069Q1	  2010 299 282,003,072	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.105 0.084 0.069Q2 293 277,068,288	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.102 0.087 0.065Q3 294 304,700,608	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.110 0.090 0.071Q4 301 307,853,184	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.109 0.093 0.075Q1	  2011 300 307,920,160	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.112 0.090 0.071Q2 300 300,403,648	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.107 0.088 0.069Q3 303 310,046,368	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.107 0.088 0.068Q4 291 292,579,616	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0.106 0.090 0.068
Table	  7.	  Average	  and	  Median	  Cash	  Ratios	  from	  2002	  to	  2011This table summarizes the evolution of cash holdings for firms in the Cash Sample, that comprises all listed firms in Economaticafrom 2002-­‐2011 (and meet the criteria in Section 3). Firms is the number of observations over which we either aggregate, averageor calculate medians in each quarter. Cash holdings are presented in levels as well as a fraction of Total Assets. The aggregate cashis	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  cash	  holdings	  for	  all	  firm	  in	  a	  given	  quarter.
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Model
(1)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pooled	  OLS
(2)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pooled	  OLS
(3)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Fixed	  Effects
(4)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Fixed	  Effects
(5)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Fixed	  Effects
Dependent	  VariableCash	  /	  Assets
Ln(Cash	  /	  Net	  
Assets)
Cash	  /	  Assets
Cash	  /	  Assets
Cash	  /	  Assets
Size
0.0120***
0.2691***
0.0134***
0.0134***
-­‐0.0336
(0.0032)
(0.0659)
(0.0034)
(0.0034)
(0.0307)
Industry	  Volatility
0.1679
1.6978
0.4199*
0.4290*
0.2570
(0.1647)
(4.0929)
(0.2395)
(0.2348)
(0.2127)
Market-­‐to-­‐Book
0.0107***
0.1450**
0.0091**
0.0089**
0.0094*
(0.0038)
(0.0594)
(0.0036)
(0.0036)
(0.0051)
Cash	  flows
-­‐0.0026
1.7279**
0.0445
0.0445
0.0529**
(0.0423)
(0.7237)
(0.0463)
(0.0467)
(0.0262)
Leverage
0.0168
-­‐0.0000
0.0097
0.0098
0.1090**
(0.0232)
(0.3342)
(0.0206)
(0.0206)
(0.0456)
Investment
0.0004
0.4944
0.0320
0.0340
-­‐0.0628**
(0.0268)
(0.5325)
(0.0299)
(0.0309)
(0.0244)
Intercept
-­‐0.0991**
-­‐7.1277***
-­‐0.1870***
-­‐0.1846***
0.5013
(0.0449)
(0.8918)
(0.0528)
(0.0532)
(0.4147)
Fixed	  Effect
Industry
Industry/Year
Firm/Year
Observations/Firms
2,457/241
2,457/241
2,457/241
2,457/241
2,457/241
Adjusted	  R-­‐squared
0.0772
0.1255
0.2419
0.2423
0.0859
Table	  8.	  Regression	  Estim
ates	  of	  the	  D
eterm
inants	  of	  Cash	  for	  Large	  Firm
s	  in	  Brazil
Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Thistableshowsestimatesforthedeterminantsofcashholdings.TheregressionsusefirmsintheCashSample,thatcomprisesalllisted
firmsinEconomaticafrom2002-­‐2011(andmeetthecriteriainSection3).ThevariablesareasdefinedinSection4.Wealsoincludedummy
variablestomeasurewhetherthefinancialcrisisaffectedthecashpolicies.Thecrisisdummyissettooneforquartersintheyearsof2008to
2010andtozeroforallotherperiods.Finally,allregressorsbutthecrisisdummyenterlaggedintheregressionsandinallspecificationsthe
standard	  errors	  are	  clustered	  at	  the	  industry	  level.
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Low 2 3 High 2008 2010 2011
A.	  Brazilian	  Economy
Banks	  characteristics	  	  Total	  Assets 4,767 9,177 31,499 163,076 42,237 60,219 73,265	  	  Risk	  Weighted	  Assets	  (RWA) 2,676 4,755 20,090 130,006 30,561 39,562 49,109	  	  Fraction	  of	  Loans 0.44 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.47	  	  Capital-­‐to-­‐Assets 0.27 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.16	  	  Deposits 0.31 0.40 0.41 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.38
B.	  Lines	  of	  Credit
Brazilian	  Economy	  	  Banks	  granting	  LCs 45.4% 39.5% 37.9%	  	  Unused	  LC	  /	  Loans 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.14	  	  Short-­‐term	  LCs 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.70 0.59 0.55 0.56
LC	  Sample	  	  Unused	  LC	  /	  Loans 0.37 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.10 0.12 0.26	  	  Short-­‐term	  LCs 0.80 0.69 0.57 0.39 0.65 0.60 0.52	  	  Unused	  LC	  /	  Assets 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02	  	  Unused	  LC	  /	  Unused	  LC	  +	  Cash 0.03 0.13 0.21 0.24 0.14 0.12 0.16
Table	  9.	  Banks,	  Loans	  and	  Lines	  of	  Credit	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Outstanding	  LCs	  quartiles Year
The table shows aggregate figures (R$ million) for the Brazilian banking sector and some descriptive statistics for credit lines. The sampleruns from March 2007 to December 2011. Two different perspectives of the LC Sample are employed: data split by the unused lines ofcredit quartiles or data for selected years, both restricted to banks that grant credit lines. The first shows averages of the variables foreach quartile of the LC distribution; We built the unused line of credit distribution in each year of the sample and categorize observationsaccordingly. The second view pictures averages for selected years in the sample. Panel A brings some banks (and credit) characteristicsfor the entire economy (SCR): Total Assets; Risk-­‐weighted assets as implemented by Basel prudential regulations; Fraction of Loans, theratio of Loan to Total Assets; ; Capital to Assets, as the ratio of Capital Tier 1 (Basel) to Total Assets; Deposits, as the ratio of Deposits toTotal Assets and ROE, defined as Net Income over Equity. Panel B describes the lines of credit. First, for the entire economy (all firms inthe SCR) and, then to the restricted LC Sample. We record the percentage of banks granting LCs; the unused lines of credit, both as afraction of credit for corporations and as a fraction of total assets; the fraction of short-­‐term LC, as the ratio of LCs with contractualmaturity	  of	  one	  year	  and	  the	  total	  unused	  LC	  amoun;	  the	  LC	  liquidity,	  the	  fraction	  of	  the	  toal	  liquidity	  provided	  by	  the	  unused	  credit	  lines.
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Model
(1)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pooled	  OLS
(2)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Fixed	  Effects
(3)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Fixed	  Effects
(4)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pooled	  OLS
(5)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pooled	  OLS
Dependent	  Variable
Unused	  LC	  /	  
(Cash+Unused	  LC)
Unused	  LC	  /	  
(Cash+Unused	  LC)
Unused	  LC	  /	  
(Cash+Unused	  LC) Unused	  LC	  <	  1	  year	  /	  
(Cash+Unused	  LC) Unused	  LC	  >	  1	  year	  /	  
(Cash+Unused	  LC)
Size
-­‐0.0364***
-­‐0.0214*
-­‐0.0626***
-­‐0.0117*
-­‐0.0362**
(0.0063)
(0.0107)
(0.0203)
(0.0063)
(0.0141)
Industry	  Volatility
0.2620***
0.2773***
0.2708***
0.1414***
0.1433***
(0.0530)
(0.0623)
(0.0558)
(0.0461)
(0.0361)
%	  AA-­‐C	  Loans
0.2672***
0.2026**
0.0870
0.0130
0.5081**
(0.0667)
(0.0935)
(0.0979)
(0.0548)
(0.2029)
Tobin's	  Q
-­‐0.0432**
-­‐0.0485**
-­‐0.0633***
-­‐0.0265***
-­‐0.0312**
(0.0166)
(0.0198)
(0.0118)
(0.0077)
(0.0120)
Cash	  flow	  /	  Assets
0.0799
0.0329
-­‐0.0840
-­‐0.0163
0.0309
(0.1281)
(0.1007)
(0.0537)
(0.0446)
(0.0747)
Leverage
-­‐0.0191
-­‐0.0254
0.1368
-­‐0.0086
-­‐0.0098
(0.0743)
(0.0983)
(0.0924)
(0.0280)
(0.1098)
Capex
-­‐0.0991
-­‐0.1149
0.0442
-­‐0.0304
-­‐0.0987
(0.0813)
(0.0793)
(0.0521)
(0.0495)
(0.0688)
Crisis	  dummy
-­‐0.0530***
-­‐0.0507***
-­‐0.0524***
-­‐0.0259**
-­‐0.0243***
(0.0181)
(0.0167)
(0.0129)
(0.0110)
(0.0084)
Relationship	  Length
0.0008
(0.0006)
Intercept
0.3744***
0.0242
0.7304**
0.1902
-­‐0.0633
(0.1253)
(0.1912)
(0.3070)
(0.1586)
(0.3075)
Fixed	  Effect
Industry/Year
Firm/Year
Industry/Year
Industry/Year
Observations
1,190
1,190
1,190
1,131
970
Adjusted	  R-­‐squared
0.3009
0.5114
0.2259
0.5084
0.1533
Table	  10.	  Lines	  of	  Credit	  and	  Firm
’s	  Characteristics
Thistableexaminestheeffectoffirm’scharacteristicsontheLCliquidityratio.TheregressionsusefirmsintheLCSample,thatrestrictsthesetoffirmsin
Economaticatothosethat:1)arecomponentsoftheIBRXindexor2)appearinthelistofthe200largest/bestfirmsinBrazil(ValorEconomicomagazine),
and3)havelinesofcreditoutstandingintheSCR(seecriteriainSection3).Totalcreditreferstoallloansoutstanding.comprisesalllistedfirmsin
Economaticafrom2002-­‐2011(andmeetthecriteriainSection3).ThevariablesareasdefinedinSection4.Wealsoincludedummyvariablestomeasure
whetherthefinancialcrisisaffectedthecashpolicies.Thecrisisdummyissettooneforquartersintheyearsof2008to2010andtozeroforallotherperiods.
Finally,	  all	  regressors	  but	  the	  crisis	  dummy	  enter	  lagged	  and	  in	  all	  specifications	  the	  standard	  errors	  are	  clustered	  at	  the	  industry	  level.
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N Avg.	  Cash	  Ratio Avg.	  Undrawn	  LC	  Ratio Total	  Liquidity N Avg.	  Cash	  Ratio2005 168 0.114 0.033 0.147 64 0.0712006 208 0.124 0.034 0.158 55 0.0882007 283 0.131 0.027 0.157 60 0.0972008 323 0.124 0.019 0.143 63 0.1132009 369 0.115 0.015 0.131 29 0.0812010 394 0.122 0.014 0.136 20 0.0712011 422 0.118 0.019 0.137 13 0.107
This table shows the evolution of the cash-­‐to-­‐assets and the unused LC-­‐to-­‐assets ratios for firms in the LC sample. The observations aresplit between the ones that have LC greater than zero and those that do not. The LC Sample, that restricts the set of firms inEconomatica to those that: 1) are components of the IBRX index or 2) appear in the list of the 200 largest/best firms in Brazil (ValorEconomico magazine), and 3) have lines of credit outstanding in the SCR (see criteria in Section 3). Total credit refers to all loansoutstanding.	  comprises	  all	  listed	  firms	  in	  Economatica	  from	  2002-­‐2011	  (and	  meet	  the	  criteria	  in	  Section	  3).LC	  outstanding	   No	  LC	  Outstanding
Table	  11.	  Average	  Cash,	  Undrawn	  LCs	  and	  Total	  Liquidity
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Year Aggregate	  Cash	  Ratio Average	  Cash	  Ratio Median	  Cash	  Ratio1999 0.092 0.102 0.0612000 0.103 0.105 0.0682001 0.108 0.094 0.0442002 0.105 0.114 0.0572003 0.132 0.111 0.0562004 0.123 0.114 0.0752005 0.132 0.122 0.0732006 0.138 0.144 0.0942007 0.126 0.156 0.1062008 0.143 0.140 0.0912009 0.128 0.144 0.1052010 0.145 0.136 0.0962011 0.137 0.144 0.0912012 0.133 0.132 0.093
Table	  12.	  Average	  and	  Median	  Cash	  Ratios	  from	  CompustatThis table summarizes the evolution of cash holdings for the Brazilian firmsCompustat Global, from 1999-­‐2012 (and meet the criteria in Section 3). Firms is thenumber of observations over which we either aggregate, average or calculatemedians in each year. Cash holdings (Compustat #1) are presented in levels as wellas a fraction of Total Assets (Compustat #6). The aggregate cash is the sum of thecash	  holdings	  for	  all	  firm	  in	  a	  given	  year.
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Appendix A
Computational details of the
estimation of assets market value
volatility
The estimation method is based on Merton (1974.) It views a firm’s equity as an Euro-
pean call option on firm’s total assets value with strike price equal to the book value debt.
As with the original work from Black and Scholes (1973), assets are assumed to follow a
lognormal stochastic process with constant volatility and the interest rate is constant. The
construction of the variables used in the procedure is as follows:
VE, the market value of common equity: (Compustat) common shares outstanding ×
price.
SE, the instantaneous standard deviation of equity returns: estimated using 3 prior
months of continuously compounded daily stock returns from CRSP and annualized assum-
ing 252 trading days in a year.
BD, the face value of debt: (Compustat) long-term debt + short-term debt.
T, time to maturity of debt: follow Barclay and Smith (1995) and assume average ma-
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turity for long-term debt and short-term debt to be approximately 5 years and 6 months,
respectively. Hence, T = (0.5STD+ 5LTD)/(STD+LTD). We also re-estimate the model
using T = 1 as done in Vassalou and Xing (2004).
r, continuously compounded 1-year Treasury Bill rate.
The joint estimation of Va and Sa, the current market value of assets and the standard
deviation of asset returns (or assets volatility), respectively, involves the numerical solution
of the non-linear system of equations from Black-Scholes. The algorithm iterates back and
forth within the two equations until it reaches a pair of values (VA, SA) that is at most 10e
−6
distant from the pair in the previous iteration. The starting values are VA = VE + BD and
SA = SEVE
VE
BD
.
The non-linear Black-Scholes equations are
VE = VAN(d1)−BDe−rTN(d2)
σE =
VAN(d1)σA
VE
where d1 =
ln(S/K)+(r+σ2/2)(T−t)
σ
√
T−t and d2 = d1 − σ
√
T − t.
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Appendix B
SCR Fields used in the study
In Table 13 we describe the variables we collect from the SCR. We use the following basic
information about the labeled transactions, aggregated for each firm-quarter in the sample:
Client
Client	  type Allows	  us	  to	  keep	  only	  the	  data	  for	  corporations	  (not	  for	  individuals)
Relationship	  date	   First	  time	  an	  active	  client	  did	  business	  with	  the	  bank	  
Risk	  class Internal	  rating	  assigned	  by	  the	  bank	  to	  the	  client
Transaction
Loan	  type
Loans are classified into different categories (e.g., working capital, receivables, project
financing, vendor). In our study we consider all types of loans registered as an asset (expect
the ones that represent guarantees). Lines of credit appear as a separate type of loan in the
database.
Source	  
The loan can be granted using either earmarked or non-­‐earmarked resources. This field
allows	  us	  to	  distinghuish	  between	  the	  two.
Interest	  rate
The interest rate associated with the operation (could be fixed, float, tied to the exchange
rate,	  etc.)	  
Date The	  date	  the	  transaction	  takes	  place.
Amount
The amount of funds being lent by the bank. For credit lines, this corresponds to the unused
amount.
Origination This	  field	  tells	  wheter	  the	  operation	  is	  originated	  by	  the	  bank	  or	  acquired	  from	  a	  third	  party.
Maturity Due	  date	  of	  the	  operation
Rating Internal	  rating	  assigned	  by	  the	  bank	  to	  the	  operation.
Table	  13.	  Information	  from	  the	  labeled	  transactions	  in	  the	  SCR	  used	  in	  the	  LC	  Sample
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Appendix C
Developments in the Brazilian Credit
Markets
We give here a broader view of the recent developments in credit markets in Brazil. As
we mentioned, this market went through deep reforms in the beginning of the 2000’s. One
important change was the improvement in the bankruptcy law that modified the priority rule.
For one, it was punitive to creditors, since even secured creditors ranked last in the payment’s
list. Also, it was leading to long lasting solvency resolutions (in Brazil, 10 years on average,
while in OECD countries it was 1.5 years). Araujo, Ferreira and Funchal (2012) describes
these changes in more detail and show that they allowed the bank loan’s market to take off.
The graphs in Figure 4 show a fast growing bank’s loans market. As a proportion of the
GDP, it reaches 49% in 2011 from around 30% in the beginning of 2007. Also, it records
the importance of the earmarked resources, granted mainly by federally owned banks. It is
worth noting that it increased by around 10p.p. when the crisis hit the Brazilian economy in
an effort of the government to maintain the market open. Finally, we observe an interesting
pattern in the unused lines of credit. It shows that the use of the credit lines around the
financial crisis is not restricted to the large firms (in the LC sample). Actually, when we
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account for the smaller firms in the economy that use credit lines, we observe more intensive
drawdowns in credit lines. The inclusion of these firms would give a better picture of the
liquidity management of the Brazilian firms.
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